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ABSTRACT 
There is a critical shortfall in dedicated special operations aviation support for the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) special operations forces (SOF).  One way this 
shortfall can be addressed is through the procurement and sustainment of an organic 
NATO SOF Air Wing.  In 2006, NATO Heads of State and Governments endorsed the 
NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative, creating what would 
eventually become the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). NSHQ coordinates, 
trains, and employs NATO’s special operations forces.  These forces have proven 
invaluable in fighting asymmetric threats due to their light, lean, and agile construct, and 
their versatile projection of high-impact tactics, techniques, and procedures that create 
strategic effects.   
 The research in this study examines NSHQ’s requirement for an organic Air Wing 
and proposes the optimal mix of aviation platforms to support NATO SOF.  This optimal 
mix contains rotary-wing and fixed-wing aviation platforms, as well as intelligence, 
surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance aircraft.  This research also examines NSHQ’s 
training and readiness organizational structure, and proposes changes based on the 
development of an organic Air Wing.  Dedicated special operations aviation support to 
NATO special operations forces will greatly enhance the capabilities and mission success 
of NATO SOF in addressing emerging security challenges. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................1 
B.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE .................................................................................2 
C.  BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................3 
D.  LITERATURE .................................................................................................4 
E.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................7 
1.  Rotary-Wing Versus Fixed-Wing .......................................................7 
2.  Manned and Unmanned Aerial Systems ...........................................8 
3.  Training and Readiness Organizational Structure ...........................8 
F.  METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................9 
II.  AIRCRAFT CATEGORIZATION ..........................................................................11 
A.  SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES—A BRIEF 
HISTORY .......................................................................................................11 
B.  DEFINITIONS ...............................................................................................13 
1.    Fixed-Wing .........................................................................................14 
2.  Rotary-Wing .......................................................................................17 
3.  ISTAR .................................................................................................18 
III.  ANALYSIS OF AIR WING REQUIREMENTS ....................................................21 
A.  OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................21 
B.  KEY DOCUMENTS ......................................................................................21 
C.  SURVEY RESULTS ......................................................................................25 
1.  Principal Task Experience ................................................................29 
2.    Preferred and Ideal Aircraft .............................................................30 
3.  Troop Capacity...................................................................................33 
4.  Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, and Reconnaissance ...........34 
D.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................35 
IV.  AIR FLEET OPTIMIZATION ................................................................................37 
A.  OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................37 
B.  SOATU COMPLEMENT—ROTARY WING AND FIXED-WING .......39 
C.  SOATU COMPLEMENT—ISTAR PLATFORMS ...................................42 
1.  Unmanned ISTAR Platforms ...........................................................42 
2.    Manned ISTAR Platforms ................................................................43 
D.   CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................44 
V.  TRAINING AND READINESS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ...............47 
A.  OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................47 
B.  NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE ....47 
C.  AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER ..............51 
1.  Overview .............................................................................................51 
2.  Organizational Structure ..................................................................51 
3.  Professionalization and Efficiencies .................................................55 
 viii
D.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO NSHQ ............................................................57 
1.  Organizational Structure ..................................................................57 
2.  Roadmaps and Leadership................................................................60 
3.  Aircrew Force Structure ...................................................................62 
VI.  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................65 
A.  OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................65 
1.  Optimized Mix of Aircraft ................................................................65 
2.  Organizational Structure ..................................................................66 
3.  Further Research ...............................................................................67 
B.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................69 
APPENDIX.  HYPOTHESIS TESTING .............................................................................71 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................75 







LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Developmental Framework. ...............................................................................9 
Figure 2.  NATO SOF Principal Task Aviation Requirements. .......................................23 
Figure 3.  NATO SOF Aviation Capability Categories. ..................................................25 
Figure 4.  Basic Demographics. .......................................................................................26 
Figure 5.  Specialties and NATO SOF Principal Tasks. ..................................................28 
Figure 6.  Approximate Number of Missions Performed for each Principal Task. .........30 
Figure 7.  Ratio of Aircraft. ..............................................................................................32 
Figure 8.  Average Number of Troops per Mission. ........................................................33 
Figure 9.  ISTAR Preferences. .........................................................................................34 
Figure 10.  NATO Military Operations 2002–2012. ..........................................................38 
Figure 11.  NATO Allied Command Operations. ..............................................................49 
Figure 12.  NATO Special Operations Headquarters. ........................................................49 
Figure 13.  NSHQ Training and Readiness System. ..........................................................50 
Figure 14.  United States Special Operations Command Components. .............................52 
Figure 15.  Air Force Special Operations Command. ........................................................52 
Figure 16.  AFSOTC Transformation Process. ..................................................................54 
Figure 17.  AFSOTC Organizational Chart........................................................................55 
Figure 18.  New NSHQ Organizational Structure. .............................................................59 
Figure 19.  NATO Special Warfare Center. .......................................................................60 
Figure 20.  Ratio of Rotary-Wing to Fixed-Wing. .............................................................73 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Relevant Literature. ............................................................................................6 
Table 2.  Project 9 Aircraft..............................................................................................12 
Table 3.  Fixed-Wing Aircraft Specifications. ................................................................16 
Table 4.  Rotary-Wing Aircraft Specifications. ..............................................................18 
Table 5.  NATO and U.S. Equivalent Ranks. .................................................................27 
Table 6.  Perceived Aviation Platform Importance Relative to Principal Task. .............31 
Table 7.  Preferred Aviation Platform Preference Relative to Principal Task. ...............31 
Table 8.  Rotary-Wing and Fixed-Wing Variants. ..........................................................40 
Table 9.  Recommended Special Operations Air Task Unit. ..........................................44 
Table 10.  Recommended NATO SOF Air Wing. ............................................................44 
Table 11.  Survey Responses—Ideal Aircraft for Mission Type. .....................................71 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFSOC  Air Force Special Operations Command 
AFSOTC  Air Force Special Operations Training Center 
ALI   Air-Land Integration 
AT   Air Transport 
 
DA   Direct Action 
 
FAA   Federal Aviation Administration 
 
ICAO   International Civil Aviation Organization 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
ISTAR   Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, and Reconnaissance 
 
JFC   Joint Force Command 
 
MA   Military Assistance 
 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NSAWS  NATO Special Air Warfare School 
NSHQ   NATO Special Operations Headquarters  
NSOS   NATO Special Operations School 
NSTEP  NATO SOF Training and Education Program 
NSTI   NATO SOF Transformation Initiative 
NSWC   NATO Special Warfare Center 
 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
SOATG  Special Operations Air Task Group 
SOATU  Special Operations Air Task Unit 
SOF   Special Operations Forces 
SOTG   Special Operations Task Group 
SOTU   Special Operations Task Unit 
SR   Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command 
 
 xiv























A shortfall exists in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) special operations 
forces (SOF) aviation support that has potential to be detrimental to mission success.  In 
particular, the requirements of NATO SOF’s three principal tasks—direct action, special 
reconnaissance and surveillance, and military assistance—are not being fulfilled.  The 
analysis in this study resulted in a recommendation for the optimal mix of rotary-wing 
and fixed-wing aircraft to be procured, operated, and maintained by the NATO SOF 
Headquarters, and is termed the NATO SOF Air Wing.  This study also recommends the 
most effective organizational structure with which to build the Air Wing’s training and 
maintain readiness.   
The NATO SOF Air Wing is composed of multiple Special Operations Air Task 
Units (SOATU).  This study focuses on constructing the SOATU, which would form a 
Special Operations Air Task Group when necessary.  The requirements for the SOATU are 
developed through an examination of key documents and the statistical analysis of the 
NATO SOF Air Wing survey.  The survey was administered to NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters personnel, multinational special operations forces who have conducted 
special operations in support of NATO, and international students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School who have NATO special operations experience.  The combination of 
key documents and survey results indicated that a nearly three-to-one mix (71.4% to 
28.6%) of rotary-wing to fixed-wing aircraft would meet the requirements of the NATO 
SOF Air Wing.  Both manned and unmanned ISTAR platforms are also required.  These 
results can be seen in Chapter III, Sections B and C. 
Determining which types of rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets should comprise 
the SOATU required an examination of recent conflicts in which NATO took part.  The 
conflicts were categorized as large-scale or small-scale.  This study concluded that NATO 
engages in one large-scale and up to four small-scale conflicts at any one time, and that 
large conflicts require up to four Special Operations Air Task Units, while small conflicts 
require one SOATU.  Additionally, a single SOATU is required to be permanently 
 xvi
assigned to garrison for initial and continuation training.  In total, a requirement exists for 
nine SOATUs to comprise the Air Wing.  This can be seen in Chapter IV, Section A.  
Sections B and C of Chapter IV determine the optimal mix of airframes and ISTAR 
aircraft that should comprise the SOATU.  The optimal mix is four medium-lift rotary-
wing aircraft, two heavy-lift rotary-wing aircraft, two medium fixed-wing aircraft, three 
unmanned ISTAR platforms, and two manned ISTAR platforms. Nine SOATUs—the NATO 
SOF Air Wing—equate to thirty-six medium-lift, eighteen heavy-lift, eighteen medium 
fixed-wing, twenty-seven unmanned ISTAR, and eighteen manned ISTAR platforms. 
Chapter V examined the training and readiness organizational structure changes 
required to meet the demands of a SOF Air Wing.  The Air Force Special Operations 
Training Center (AFSOTC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida was selected as a potential model.  
Through AFSOTC organizational analysis and interviews with key personnel, this study 
determined that a new entity should be established under NSHQ—the NATO Special 
Warfare Center (NSWC) that is commanded by an OF-6.  The NSWC would consist of the 
NATO Special Operations School and the NATO Special Air Warfare School, both 
commanded by an OF-5 and on par with the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Support, 
Operations, and Readiness.  These proposed changes can be seen in Chapter V, 
Section D. 
The strategic utility of NATO special operations forces is instrumental in achieving 
and maintaining security not only for the Alliance members, but in each region of the 
globe.  An organic NATO special operations aviation capability will increase the 
effectiveness of NATO SOF and enable mission success as the Alliance tackles complex 
global security challenges.  The NATO SOF Air Wing recommended in this study provides 
a construct to assist NSHQ meet its special operations aviation goals, better enabling 
NATO SOF to meet the threats of the twenty-first century. 
 xvii
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the key lessons learned from [Operation EAGLE CLAW] is that the 
operational packaging of SOF requires organic, dedicated, or habitually-
associated air assets and capabilities specifically tailored and embedded 
in the force structure to perform or support special air operations.1 
—Lt Gen Frank J. Kisner, Commander, NSHQ, 2011 
A. OVERVIEW 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 in response 
to the growing threat of the Soviet Union following World War II.  It is both a political 
and a military alliance that, according to its website, “promotes democratic values and 
encourages consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues … and is 
committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes,” but will utilize its military power when 
necessary.2  There are twenty eight members of the Alliance, and many others associated 
with the Alliance through different programs, such as Partnership for Peace. 
The Alliance, effective enough to outlast the Soviet Union, faces different threats 
in the current global landscape.  Many of these threats originate from non-state actors 
employing asymmetric means, including terrorism, to carry out their agendas.  Security is 
paramount, and its importance is punctuated by successful terrorist actions; unsuccessful 
terrorist actions serve as reminders that the Alliance, and all who oppose such aggression, 
must be proactive in its defense.  Special operations forces (SOF) have proven invaluable 
in fighting asymmetric threats due to their light, lean, and agile construct, and their 
versatile projection of high-impact tactics, techniques, and procedures that create 
strategic effects.  However, prior to 2006, NATO lacked an organization that could 
coordinate, train, and employ SOF.  At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO’s Heads of State and 
Governments endorsed the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI) that, in the words 
of then-NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “aim[ed] to increase the ability 
                                                 
1 Frank J. Kisner, “Kindelan Speech,” delivered November 18, 2011, author’s collection.  Operation 
EAGLE CLAW was the aborted hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980. 
2 “What is NATO?” accessed January 2012, 
http://www.NATO.int/cps/en/NATOlive/what_is_NATO.htm. 
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of Special Operations Forces to train and operate together” and “has already proven to be 
a tremendous success.”3  The Transformation Initiative created the NATO SOF 
Coordination Center, which reorganized into the NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) in 
2010.  The current commander of all NATO military forces, U.S. Navy Admiral James 
Stavridis, states that “the emergence of NSHQ comes at an opportune moment as NATO 
looks to the horizon at emerging security challenges in which the agility of Special 
Operations Forces will proved enormously advantageous to the Alliance.”4 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
A shortfall exists in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s special operations 
forces aviation support that has potential to be detrimental to mission success.  In 
particular, the requirements of NATO SOF’s three principal tasks—direct action, special 
reconnaissance and surveillance, and military assistance—are not being fulfilled.  The 
analysis in this study resulted in a recommendation for the optimal mix of fixed-wing and 
rotary-wing aircraft to be procured, operated, and maintained by the NATO SOF 
Headquarters, along with the most effective organizational structure with which to build 
its associated training and maintain readiness.  Tilt-rotor aircraft are not considered in this 
study due to the aircraft’s limited availability.  Should tilt-rotor aircraft become widely 
available in the future, additional research should include this type of aircraft.  This 
optimal aircraft mix and associated training and readiness organizational structure will 
satisfy the requirements of the principal tasks and will assist NSHQ in reducing current 
shortfalls in NATO SOF aviation, better enabling NATO SOF to meet the threats of the 
Twenty-First Century.  
The scope of this research includes analysis of special operations aviation 
capabilities, NATO SOF aviation desires based on NATO principal tasks and NATO 
leadership and ground force inputs, and U.S. Air Force special operations aviation  
 
                                                 
3 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “NATO Special Operations Forces: Key to Mission 
Success at Strategic Level,” (2009): 2. 
4 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “NATO Special Operations Forces: The Future Has 
Begun,” (2011): 3. 
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training and readiness organizational structure.  The analysis in this study can be exported 
to any nation or international organization that desires to procure, operate, and maintain 
its own fleet of SOF aircraft. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The 2010 NSHQ Biennial Review highlights the deficiency in NATO SOF aviation 
support, and states: 
The lack of air support significantly degrades the capability to conduct 
Special Operations, restricting SOF units in range, stealth, and speed…. 
[A] recurring loss of critical assets and subsequent mission cancelation 
often translates to significant opportunity costs.5 
The importance placed on NATO SOF demands that they be equipped accordingly.  NATO 
SOF Headquarters does not own and operate its own aircraft, and NATO SOF are at the 
mercy of partner nations that are not necessarily able to commit air support.   
According to its mission statement, NSHQ “is the primary point of development, 
direction and coordination for all NATO Special Operations-related activities in order to 
optimize employment of Special Operations Forces to include providing an operational 
command capability when directed by SACEUR.”6  Since September 11, 2001, the United 
States and its allies have been engaged in combat and non-combat operations in an effort 
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat extremist organizations.  The complexity with which 
these organizations operate requires integrated, multifaceted military efforts from all 
nations that place importance on preserving their way of living.  Special operations forces 
have been, and will continue to be, integral in the fight against extremist organizations 
and their supporters; the importance of international SOF is highlighted by the creation of 
NSHQ.   
Twenty-six of the twenty-eight NATO member nations have a SOF capability, but 
only six have a special operations aviation capability.  These SOF units are responsible 
                                                 
5 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “Biennial Review,” (2010): 52. 
6 NATO, “Campaign Design Framework,” accessed July 10, 2011, 
http://www.NSHQ.NATO.int/NSHQ/NSHQ_Campaign_Design_Framework.pdf. 
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not only for NATO security, but also for that of their home nation.  The lack of dedicated 
NATO SOF aviation causes intermittent contact and training, creating ad hoc SOF 
organizations in time of conflict; mission degradation, cancelations, and overall 
ineffectiveness are trademark results of SOF organizations without habitual training 
relationships.7  The NSTI has made considerable progress in building lasting, cohesive 
relationships among member nation SOF, but more must be done to create an effective 
force.  
D. LITERATURE 
The literature review is divided into two categories: (1) relevance to a NATO SOF 
Air Wing concept, and (2) relevance to a NATO SOF Air Wing organizational construct.  
Each piece of literature analyzed has been looked at through one, or both, of these two 
lenses. 
Many of the references contain supportive information regarding the formation 
and expansion of NATO SOF into its own entity, whether in its initial form of the NATO 
SOF Coordination Center, or its current form as the NATO SOF Headquarters.  There is 
mutual agreement among many of the authors that it is imperative SOF become its own 
organization within NATO.  Many of the references’ authors—among them Admiral 
James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Admiral William H. McRaven, 
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, and Lieutenant General Frank J. Kisner, 
Commander, NSHQ—also agree that dedicated airmen and airlift, and the habitual 
training relationships that develop are essential to SOF reducing its documented mission 
degradation and failures due to lack of aviation support.  Several documents outline 
aviation support in relation to the NATO SOF principal tasks, and only one attempts to 
argue in favor of particular aircraft and unit size.  Although this one document provides 
an outline for specific aviation capabilities and assets, it does so only on a minimal scale 
and does not meet the larger needs of NATO SOF, nor does it provide a robust 
organizational structure under which the aviation program can mature.   
                                                 
7 NATO, “Narrative—The Story of NATO SOF,” accessed July 10, 2011, 
http://www.NSHQ.NATO.int/NSHQ/page/APCN/. 
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A critical void in the literature is that the extended requirements of NATO SOF 
aviation are not addressed.  The research in this study examines all of the activities within 
the principal tasks to determine NATO SOF aviation requirements, as well as produces 
descriptive statistics on ground and maritime operator desires, in order to provide a 
thorough breakdown of each type of aircraft needed to satisfy NATO SOF aviation 
requirements.  The research also yields an organizational structure that will optimize 
NATO SOF aviation training and doctrine implementation.  To the best of my knowledge, 
no document exists that has accomplished the full intent of this research. 
Table 1 contains a stoplight chart for each piece of literature relative to the two 
lenses through which it was examined.  Each reference contains a short description of the 
material.  If the reference contains strong relation to a particular lens, it is colored green 
and contains a “G” to the right of its description; if the material is somewhat relative and 
might be of use, it is colored yellow and contains a “Y” to the right of its description.  If 
the reference does not provide useful material, it is colored red and contains a “R” to the 
right of its description.  The “Reference” column contains only the title of the literature—













Reference Relevance to NATO SOF Air Wing 
Relevance to Organizational 
Construct 
NATO Special Operations 
Forces: Key to Mission Success 
at Strategic Level 
Outlines principal tasks and 
discusses associated aviation 
requirements 
G Relative to NSHQ as a whole Y 
NSHQ Special Operations Air 
Group 
Very specific discussion on 
requirements and platforms G 
Very specific discussion on 
organizational structure G 
Special Operations Aviation in 
NATO: A Vector to the Future 
Discusses air wing concept 
and aviation requirements G 
Discusses need for dedicated 
airmen and aircraft G 
USAF Irregular Warfare 
Concept White Paper (AFSOC) 
Outlines activities associated 
with IW and their aviation 
requirement (heavy on 
AvFID) 
G 
Discusses need for wing, not 
how the wing should be 
administratively structured 
Y 
Creating a NATO Special 
Operations Force 
Does not address aviation 
requirements R 
Discusses organizational 
breakdown of NATO SOF, to 
include U.S. coordination 
G 
Transforming NATO Special 
Operations 
Does not address aviation 
requirements R 
Discusses organization only at 
the NSCC level Y 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Special 
Operations Forces Study 
Annex A discusses air 
mobility requirements G 
Section V—relative to NSHQ 
as a whole.  Annex A—need 
for SOF air component 
G 
NSHQ Biennial Review, 2010 Discusses need for air mobility and ISTAR support G 
Discusses organization only at 
the NSHQ level Y 
NSHQ Manual 80-004, Special 
Air Warfare Manual 
Chapter 1 outlines 
fundamentals of Special Air 
Warfare 
G Chapter 2/4—C2 and Organization G 
The 21st Century Air Force 
Irregular Warfare White Paper 
Discusses requirement for 
irregular warfare aviation 
capability 
G 
Discusses organization only 
within purview of current 
USAF alignment 
Y 
Spec Ops: Case Studies in 
Special Operations Warfare 
Theory and Practice 
Principle of REPETITION 
applies, particularly in the 
examples using glider aircraft 
G 
McRaven’s theory validates 
the need, through case study 
analysis, for standing SOF 
G 
In the Devil’s Shadow: UN 
Special Operations During the 
Korean War 
Offers examples of various 
spec ops ad-hockery with 
respect to aviation 
Y 
Conclusion outlines 
drawbacks of not having 
dedicated C2 structure for 
spec ops, with some emphasis 
on aviation 
G 
United States Air Force 
Warfare Center  Air Advisor 
Handbook 
Provides background, 
requirements, and TTPs for 
military air advisors (MA) 
G 
Discusses organizational 
structure for air advisor units 
and ops in Partner Nations 
G 
Airpower in Small Wars: 
Fighting Insurgents and 
Terrorists 
Provides history of airpower 
in low-intensity conflicts G 
Discusses command and 
control of air assets in low-
intensity conflicts 
Y 
Kindelan Speech by Lt Gen 
Kisner 
Provides vision and support 
for NATO SOF Air Wing G 
Addresses current efforts to 
develop guidance for NATO 
SOF Air Wing way ahead 
Y 
Table 1.   Relevant Literature. 
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E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
NATO’s special operations forces can operate in hostile, denied, and politically 
sensitive areas in all portions of the globe, although oftentimes the operating environment 
is dynamic and uncertain.  NATO SOF’s broad scope of responsibility is outlined by its 
three principal tasks: direct action (DA), special reconnaissance and surveillance (SR), 
and military assistance (MA).  Direct action missions are often used against “well defined 
targets of strategic and operational significance,” and employ a host of tactics including, 
but not limited to, raid, ambush, direct assault, munitions placement, and acting as liaison 
and terminal guidance for ground, air, and naval weapons delivery.8  SR involves the 
collection of high-value, often time-sensitive, information when traditional collection 
methods are deficient, and may include the use of techniques, equipment, and collection 
methods from host-nation or indigenous forces.9  Military assistance is similar to USSOF’s 
Foreign Internal Defense activities, and includes support to other nations or indigenous 
forces in peace, crisis, and conflict, through training, material assistance, or direct 
employment.10  A future NATO SOF Air Wing must be able to support these three 
principal tasks.  The author investigated three hypotheses to develop an optimized air 
wing.  
1. Rotary-Wing Versus Fixed-Wing 
Due to the wide range of required capabilities, a more varied mix of fixed-wing 
aircraft types than rotary-wing aircraft types will be necessary.  It is clear that NATO 
SOF’s responsibilities cover an immense spectrum.  Dedicated special operations aviation 
support is necessary to enable ground and maritime SOF to successfully accomplish their 
missions in support of NATO SOF’s principal tasks.  While rotary-wing assets find optimal 
employment at the terminal point of most SOF missions, such as infiltration and 
exfiltration of forces, most rotary-wing requirements can be filled by a single type of 
light lift and a single type of medium-lift asset.  Fixed-wing assets, on the other hand, 
                                                 
8 NATO, “NATO Special Operations Forces: Key to Mission Success at Strategic Level,” (2009): 12. 
9 NATO, “Key to Mission Success,” 11–12. 
10 NATO, “Key to Mission Success,” 12. 
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will require a heavy-lift capability in addition to a light and medium-lift capability, as 
well as Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets.    
2. Manned and Unmanned Aerial Systems 
The optimized mix of ISTAR assets will include both manned and unmanned aerial 
systems.  According to the 2010 NSHQ Biennial Review, SOF are restricted by the 
deficiency of ISTAR assets; indeed, a “recurring loss of [ISTAR] assets and subsequent 
mission cancelation often translates to significant opportunity costs.”11  Rotary wing 
assets are capable of performing this mission, but are limited by duration.  Fixed-wing 
assets may provide greater longevity, contributing to improved capabilities over a longer 
period of collection development.  Currently there are a multitude of examples with 
fixed-wing ISTAR capabilities, to include manned and unmanned aerial systems.  While 
more publicity exposes the capabilities of unmanned systems more than manned systems, 
such as ongoing drone strikes in Pakistan, manned systems have proved extremely 
valuable in many current operations. 
3. Training and Readiness Organizational Structure 
Assuming NSHQ is given the ability to procure, operate, and maintain an organic 
SOF aviation fleet, NATO SOF’s training and readiness section will need to overhaul its 
organizational structure to account for a wide range of aircraft capabilities and aircrew 
skill.  Their current structure is insufficient to meet the demands of an organic air wing.  
NSHQ’s current training and doctrine is administered through an organization called 
NSTEP—the NATO SOF Training and Education Program.  NSTEP offers a variety of 
programs with the aim of “[advancing] the integration, synchronization, and 
interoperability of all SOF.”12  Aviation support to NATO SOF has been a limiting factor, 
as “Nations are reluctant to release [aviation] assets not only for NATO operations, but 
also for inclusion in deliberate planning and response force rotations.”13  The right mix of 
                                                 
11 NSHQ, “Biennial Review,” 52. 
12 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “NSTEP Overview,” accessed August 21, 2011, 
http://www.NSHQ.NATO.int/NSTEP/page/overview/. 
13 NSHQ, “Biennial Review,” 51. 
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aircraft, and an effective training and readiness organizational structure, will permit NATO 
SOF to remain efficient and flexible, and reduce or eliminate mission degradation. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Developmental Framework. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The research topic is addressed using three avenues: (1) categorization of aircraft 
through defining and highlighting special operations aviation characteristics and 
capabilities, (2) combining pertinent NATO documents with interview and survey research 
conducted with NATO SOF personnel, and (3) analysis of U.S. Air Force special 
operations aviation training organizational structure using AFSOC’s Air Force Special 
Operations Training Center (AFSOTC) as a model. 
Historical examples of special operations aviation demonstrate the inherent 
flexibility and versatility of both aircraft and aircrew.  The proposed optimal NATO SOF 




historical special operations aviation examples and current aviation authoritative 
guidance to develop definitions and categories of aircraft that comprise the proposed 
NATO SOF Air Wing.  
Additionally, this study uses survey research and interviews to gain additional 
insight which was not readily available in published data. Written endorsement from 
NSHQ and AFSOC was obtained prior to conducting the surveys and interviews.  The 
survey population consisted of NSHQ personnel, students and cadre from the NATO SOF 
Training and Education Program (NSTEP), NATO SOF-affiliated international students 
enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis, and 
international SOF personnel that have performed deployed combat actions with NATO SOF 
at the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) and Special Operations Task Unit (SOTU) 
levels.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted at NATO Special Operations Headquarters 
in Mons, Belgium, at NSTEP’s facilities at Chièvres Air Base, Belgium, and at U.S. Air 
Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt Field, FL with senior officers in key 
positions.  Surveys and interviews provided additional insight into the strengths and 
weaknesses of NATO SOF air support over the previous two decades, as well as vision for 
a more robust NATO SOF aviation capability. 
Finally, most organizations cannot function successfully without an effective 
structure.  USSOF has been highlighted by NATO’s Training and Readiness Division as a 
model upon which to build—“The habitual relationships of the ground and air 
components of U.S. Special Operations Forces during training and operations produced 
unprecedented effects in a short period of time and should be a model for NATO SOF 
operations.”14  Therefore, this research included an organizational analysis of USSOF 
aviation using the AFSOTC model, and compared that organization to current NATO SOF 
training and readiness structure.  A training and readiness organizational model for the 
proposed NATO SOF Air Wing is recommended based on that analysis. 
                                                 
14 NATO, “Key to Mission Success,” 14. 
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II. AIRCRAFT CATEGORIZATION 
A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES—A BRIEF 
HISTORY 
Ten feet and 6.8 miles per hour—these numbers describe the maximum altitude 
and top speed of the first manned powered flight made by Orville Wright in the Wright 
Flyer more than a century ago in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.15  Eighty-five thousand 
sixty-eight feet and 2,193.167 miles per hour—these numbers describe the altitude and 
speed records set by men flying the military reconnaissance airframe SR-71 Blackbird in 
1976.16  Seventy-three years, 85,058 feet, and 2,186.367 miles per hour separate these 
two aerial achievements, and over thirty-five years have passed since the Blackbird 
records were set.  Many aviation companies, airframes, concepts, and capabilities have 
been developed since Orville’s flight.  The Lockheed C-130 Hercules, for example, has 
been modified to provide tactical airlift, close air support in the form of a gunship, 
airborne firefighting, search and rescue, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, 
psychological operations, land on snow and ice with skis, and fly into hurricanes for 
weather reconnaissance—and this list is not all-inclusive.    
Historical examples of aircraft used in special operations offer a broad array of 
types and capabilities.  The U.S. special operations aviation community is rooted in the 
World War II-era top secret operation, Project 9.  Project 9 was established to assist 
British General Orde Wingate’s long-range penetration missions performed by the 
Chindits in the China-Burma-India theater of operations.  The all-volunteer Project 9 
force consisted of 348 aircraft and 523 men, and was assembled in less than thirty days.17  
Embarking on what came to be known as Operation THURSDAY, the airmen performed 
low-level infiltration, extraction, glider operations, short takeoff and landing operations 
                                                 
15 National Park Service, “The First Flight—1903,” accessed January 25, 2012, 
http://www.nps.gov/wrbr/historyculture/thefirstflight.htm. 
16 “Blackbird Records,” accessed January 25, 2012, http://www.sr-71.org/blackbird/records.php. 
17 Herbert A. Mason, Jr., Operation Thursday: The Birth of the Air Commandos (Honolulu, HI: 
University Press of the Pacific, 1994), 15. 
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from unimproved surfaces, aerial resupply, observation, close air support, and casualty 
and medical evacuation.  Following Operation THURSDAY, General Hap Arnold, Chief of 
the U.S. Army Air Corps, officially named the aviation unit the 1st Air Commando 




Table 2.   Project 9 Aircraft.18 
The Korean War provided another example of the broad and unique abilities of 
special operations aviation.  Unit 4, later called the Special Air Mission detachment, was 
carved out of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron and began performing tasks for Operation 
AVIARY.19  These tasks, crucial to the United Nations efforts in Korea, included Korean 
agent parachute drops behind enemy lines, psychological warfare in the form of leaflet 
drops and loudspeaker broadcasts, cargo hauling, casualty evacuation, and strike 
missions.  Some of these strike missions were the result of special operations ingenuity—
Unit 4 commander, Captain Heinie Aderholt, slung napalm drop tanks  to the bottom of 
C-47 transports and unleashed his crews to “attack targets of opportunity with the very 
                                                 
18 Mason, Operation Thursday, 15. 
19 Michael E. Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 92. 
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unauthorized ‘C-47 low-level bombers.’”20  The final two years of the Korean War saw 
B Flight, 6167th Operations Squadron perform special operations air missions with its  
B-26, C-47, and C-47 aircraft—these missions included more agents insertions and 
psychological operations, as well as “Firefly” missions that utilized flares to light up 
enemy positions at night.21 
The 1960s era contains several examples of special operations aviation in both 
southwest and southeast Asia.  As Kurds began to establish their own autonomous region 
in the northern portion of Iran in 1963, the Shah of Iran requested help for the United 
States.  Help came in the form of a large Green Beret team and just two special 
operations pilots.  The pilots modified T-6 aircraft with machine guns, rockets, and 
bombs to perform close air support missions, and C-47s with special gear to perform 
psychological warfare missions.22  The two pilots acted in an advisory role as Iranian 
pilots effectively flew the modified aircraft, nullifying the Kurdish threat.  Well-
chronicled are the special operations aviation efforts in southeast Asia during the same 
time period.  Aviators flying C-123 defoliation missions over Vietnam for Project RANCH 
HAND, AC-47 “Puff the Magic Dragon” Gunships in close air support missions for 
ground special operations teams, and training, advising, and assisting Vietnamese, 
Laotian, and Thai pilots in the Farm Gate Detachment highlights potential roles and 
missions for special operations aviation, and articulates the flexibility and versatility of 
both the aircraft and the airmen who crew them. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
This study does not focus on specific aircraft, such as the Hercules or Sikorsky 
CH-47 helicopter.  Rather, it proposes the NATO SOF air wing consistency in terms of 
groups and numbers of light, medium, and heavy aircraft.  These numbers are based on 
stated and desired capabilities, which will be analyzed in Chapter III.  Three groups of 
                                                 
20 Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow, 96. 
21 Michael E. Haas, Apollo’s Warriors: U.S. Air Force Special Operations During the Cold War 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 40–49. 
22 Michael E. Haas, Air Commando! 1950-1975: Twenty-Five Years at the Tip of the Spear (Hurlburt 
Field, FL: Air Force Special Operations Command, 1994), 39. 
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aircraft are examined.  The first two groups are fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.  
Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft are further categorized into light, medium, and 
heavy.  The third group of aircraft is intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and 
reconnaissance (ISTAR) aircraft, which can be either fixed-wing or rotary-wing.  The 
identification of specific airframes within each group is intended solely to provide 
examples of those respective types of aircraft, and is not intended to be a 
recommendation of specific aircraft for NATO SOF procurement.  Aircraft specifications 
for the fixed-wing and rotary-wing examples listed in the following sections can be 
viewed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
1.   Fixed-Wing 
Definitions for light, medium, and heavy fixed-wing aircraft must be developed.  
One might naturally look to the two formal authorities that govern most global aviation 
activity, the Federal Aviation Administration, or FAA (the United States’ aviation 
authority), and the International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO (a United Nations 
agency that sets aviation standards and regulations for all of its 191 Member States), for 
assistance.23  The FAA offers definitions for “small aircraft” as equal to or less than 
12,500 pounds maximum certificated takeoff weight, with “large aircraft” being those 
that weigh more than 12,500 pounds.24 There are also FAA definitions for small 
(maximum certificated takeoff weight of 41,000 pounds or less), large (between 
41,000 pounds and 300,000 pounds), and heavy (300,000 pounds or more) aircraft with 
regard to wake turbulence minimum distance separation requirements.25  Interestingly 
enough, the ICAO offers different weight delineations for their wake turbulence criteria.  
To round out the discussion, neither “light,” nor “medium,” nor “heavy” fixed-wing 
aircraft definitions can be found in United States military publications or regulations.   
                                                 
23 International Civil Aviation Organization, “ICAO in Brief,” accessed January 26, 2012, 
http://www.icao.int/Pages/icao-in-brief.aspx. 
24 Federal Aviation Administration, “Small Airplanes,” accessed January 26, 2012. 
http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/small_airplanes/faq/. 
25 Federal Aviation Administration, “Pilot Controller Glossary,” accessed January 26, 2012, 
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/ATPubs/PCG/A.HTM. 
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Though concrete definitions do not exist, one will still find these terms in key 
government documents.  For example, the United States Forestry Service documents the 
use of light fixed-wing aircraft in firefighting roles, but fails to provide a definition.  
They do, however, attempt to identify “Heavy” aircraft as those weighing more than 
12,500 pounds, although there is no FAA or ICAO basis for this delineation.26  The 
2010 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review references the purchase of 
“light fixed-wing aircraft” with regard to aviation foreign internal defense, yet offers no 
solid definition of “light fixed-wing.”27   
To clarify the apparent gray area of identifying just what light, medium, and 
heavy aircraft are, this study developed definitions of each, informed by both FAA 
definitions and more than a decade of flying fixed-wing turboprop aircraft.  For the 
purposes of this study, the following definitions apply: 
 
Light Fixed-Wing: Aircraft that weigh 12,500 pounds or less.  A “type rating” is a 
certificate that a pilot must possess to fly certain types of aircraft—those types, as defined 
in Federal Aviation Regulation Part 61, weigh more than 12,500 pounds or are powered 
by a turbojet.  In almost all cases, the FAA does not require a type rating for aircraft that 
weigh 12,500 pounds or less.  Aircraft of this size can typically carry up to 20 passengers.  
Examples of light fixed-wing aircraft are the Cessna 208 Caravan, the Pilatus PC-12, and 
the De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter. 
 
Medium Fixed-Wing: Aircraft that weigh more than 12,500 pounds, but less than 
150,000 pounds. Aircraft of this size will typically carry between twenty and 
100 passengers, and in many cases can fly higher, farther, and faster than light fixed-wing 
aircraft.  Examples of medium fixed-wing aircraft are the CASA CN-235, the Alenia  
C-27J Spartan, and the Transall C-160. 
 
                                                 
26 United States Forestry Service, Region 5 Light Fixed-Wing Aircraft Program, accessed January 26, 
2012, www.fs.fed.us/r5/fire/aviation/light_fixed_wing.doc, 77. 
27 Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), 30. 
 16
Heavy Fixed-Wing: Aircraft that weigh 150,000 pounds or more.  Examples  
of heavy fixed-wing aircraft are the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, the Boeing  
C-17 Globemaster III, and the Airbus A400M.  Aircraft of this size can typically carry 
more than 100 passengers and large volumes of cargo.  The nature of NATO SOF suggests 
that they operate in small teams, and would not require all the services that heavy fixed-
wing aircraft can provide as they move to and from objective areas.  Deployments to and 
from a theater of operations, however, do require heavy fixed-wing aircraft due to the 
amount of equipment that accompany SOF teams—in these cases, existing NATO C-17 
aircraft can be utilized.  For these reasons, heavy fixed-wing aircraft are not examined in 
this study.   
 
 
Table 3.   Fixed-Wing Aircraft Specifications. 
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2. Rotary-Wing 
The FAA does not differentiate between fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft in 
terms of type rating—helicopters weighing above 12,500 pounds also require one.  When 
categorizing rotary-wing aircraft, however, the type rating standard is not adequate.  
Since NATO SOF is concerned with getting troops to and from the objective, the lift 
capability, specifically in terms of passengers and equipment, is the most effective way to 
categorize rotary-wing aircraft. 
 
Light Lift Rotary-Wing: Rotary wing aircraft that can accommodate up to ten 
passengers or carry a payload up to 5,000 pounds. Examples of light lift helicopters are 
the McDonnell Douglas MD500 Defender, the Eurocopter EC 635, and the 
AugustaWestland AW159 Lynx Wildcat. 
 
Medium Lift Rotary-Wing: Rotary wing aircraft that can accommodate eleven to 
twenty five passengers or carry a payload between 5,000 and 15,000 pounds.  Examples 
of medium-lift helicopters are the Aéropastiale SA330 Puma, the Sikorsky UH-60, and 
the NH Industries NH90. 
 
Heavy-Lift Rotary-Wing: Rotary wing aircraft that can accommodate more than 
twenty five passengers or carry a payload over 15,000 pounds.  Examples of heavy-lift 




Table 4.   Rotary-Wing Aircraft Specifications. 
3. ISTAR 
Intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance, or ISTAR is quickly 
becoming one of the most sought-after capabilities requested by special operations forces 
at every level of command.28 ISTAR aircraft contain a multitude of sensors for data 
collection, ranging from electro-optical and infrared cameras to communication and 
signals intelligence equipment.  Most current systems can provide high definition video 
feeds, as well as laser range finding data and laser designation of targets for weapons 
delivery and other sensor acquisition.  It is also possible to weaponize ISTAR aircraft, as 
evidenced by recent drone strikes in Pakistan.29  
                                                 
28 “ISTAR” is the NATO term for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). 
29 Scott Shane, “Drone Strike Kills Qaeda Operative in Pakistan, U.S. Says,” New York Times, 
January 19, 2012, accessed January 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/world/asia/us-says-
qaeda-operative-killed-in-drone-strike.html. 
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Two types of ISTAR exist: manned and unmanned.  Both types of systems provide 
many of the same services, as the intelligence collection sensors are similar among most 
platforms.  While a definition is not required to differentiate between manned and 
unmanned systems, several differences exist that are worth mentioning.  Manned ISTAR 
systems provide the advantages of better communication gear and transit time between 
multiple objectives, and can fly in degraded weather conditions.  Most importantly, the 
aircrew is engaged overhead the objective with increased situational awareness, and can 
quickly adapt to changing operational conditions.  Examples of manned ISTAR aircraft are 
the MC-12W Liberty, which uses a Beechcraft King Air platform, and the Diamond 
Industries DA42.30 Unmanned ISTAR systems, on the other hand, can provide longer 
loiter times than manned aircraft, and they eliminate human exposure to surface-to-air 
threats.  Examples of unmanned ISTAR aircraft are the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator 
and the AAI Corporation RQ-7 Shadow.31 
                                                 
30 Aurora Flight Science, “Centaur: The Ultimate in Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance,” accessed January 29, 2012, http://www.aurora.aero/Products/Centaur.aspx.  
31 AAI Corporation, “Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” accessed January 29, 2012, 
http://www.aaicorp.com/products/uas/shadow_family.html.  
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III. ANALYSIS OF AIR WING REQUIREMENTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
If NATO SOF is to procure and operate its own fleet of aircraft, a starting point 
must be established to narrow down the scope of airframes from which to choose.  As 
stated in Chapter II, the airframes will be divided into three categories—fixed-wing, 
rotary-wing, and ISTAR.  Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft will be subdivided into 
light, medium, and heavy, and ISTAR aircraft will be subdivided into manned and 
unmanned.  Narrowing the scope into these categories can be done by analyzing NATO 
SOF documents, as well as requirements resulting from survey research of NATO SOF 
personnel. 
B. KEY DOCUMENTS 
There are numerous documents that describe aviation capabilities required of 
NATO special operations forces.  In particular, the NSHQ Special Air Warfare Manual, the 
2010 NSHQ Special Operations Air Group Concept for Development and Organization, 
and the NATO Industrial Advisory Group Study stipulate several requirements.  The 
Special Air Warfare Manual defines special air warfare as “those activities conducted by 
air/aviation forces using tactics, techniques, and modes of employment not standard to 
conventional forces,” and describes the special air warfare airmen as exhibiting the 
ability to employ any equipment they have in unconventional and innovative methods.32  
If this definition seems broad, that is the intent.  While many SOF missions tend have 
limited objectives and thus limited flexibility at the tactical level, the ability of SOF to 
perform a wide array of missions at the strategic level demands a broad set of parameters.  
For NATO SOF, these parameters are defined by the capabilities needed to accomplish 
NATO SOF’s principal tasks of direct action (DA), special reconnaissance and surveillance 
(SR), and military assistance (MA).  As the NSHQ Commander adequately stated, the 
                                                 
32 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “NSHQ Manual 80-004, Special Air Warfare Manual,” 
March 10, 2010: 3. 
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NATO SOF special air warfare capability “must be able to conduct special air operations in 
support of SOF SR, DA, and MA missions across the entire spectrum of conflict and 
across the entire spectrum of alternate operating environments.”33 
The Special Air Warfare Manual lists the aviation requirements of the principal 
tasks, and can be found in Figure 2.  Two common threads among these requirements are 
specialized air transport (AT) and intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and 
reconnaissance (ISTAR) aircraft.  AT, identified in the manual as the primary mission of 
special operations air forces, can be provided by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, and 
include infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply capabilities.34  The Special Air Warfare 
Manual suggests that the minimum requirements for certification as a NATO Special 
Operations Air Task Unit, or SOATU (a tactical-level group of special operations aviation 
elements capable of supporting or conduction special operations), are: (1) support at least 
one of the NATO SOF principal tasks, and be able to do so in multiple environments, 
(2) insert or extract up to sixteen special operations personnel and their equipment 
100 nautical miles away from a starting point, day or night, using night vision devices, 
with a time-on-target of less than one minute accuracy, and (3) fixed-wing aircraft must 
be able to perform takeoff and landing operations from short, unimproved airfields at 
night, using night vision devices.35   
ISTAR support to ground and maritime forces is crucial, as special operations 
forces rely on timely and accurate intelligence not only in the planning phase of an 
operation, but in the execution phase as well.  The Special Air Warfare Manual cites 
ISTAR as a key enabler for direct action and special reconnaissance and surveillance 
missions, as well as a key additional capability that meets the needs of the NATO special 
operations task units and groups.36  ISTAR aircraft can be manned or unmanned, and the 
gained information can be fused with other forms of intelligence to create enhanced 
situational awareness at all levels of conflict.  
                                                 
33 Kisner, “Kindelan Speech.” 
34 NSHQ, “Special Air Warfare Manual,” 6. 
35 NSHQ, “Special Air Warfare Manual,” 11. 
36 NSHQ, “Special Air Warfare Manual,” 6, 7, 10. 
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Figure 2.   NATO SOF Principal Task Aviation Requirements.37 
The NSHQ Special Operations Air Group Concept, completed in 2010, echoes the 
need for AT and ISTAR capabilities.  This document examines the requirements for AT 
and ISTAR and proposes a solid course of action for establishing an initial rotary-wing 
capability for NSHQ.  Though this concept document does not provide a fully capable 
NATO SOF aviation capability, it is incredibly valuable for its research and detailed 
findings, much of which can be applied to the analysis of NATO SOF principal task 
requirements.  To support DA, SR, and MA missions, the Air Group Concept identifies 
three capabilities that should be resident in a NATO SOF aviation entity—air-land 
integration, air mobility, and ISTAR.38  While air-land integration, which contains such 
capabilities as forward air control, terminal attack control, and combat control, is vital, it 
is beyond the scope of this research and should be examined in a separate study.  Air 
mobility and ISTAR, on the other hand, are two components that do fit into this research.   
Citing interviews with NATO SOF personnel returning from deployments in 
Afghanistan, lack of proper special operations airlift was identified as a key factor in 
                                                 
37 NSHQ, “Special Air Warfare Manual,” 5–9. 
38 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “Special Operations Air Group: Concept for Development 
and Organization,” April 22, 2010: 7. 
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mission alteration or cancellation.39  Dedicated special operations air mobility assets are 
desired to increase timeliness and reliability for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply, as 
well as to build the habitual working relationship between air and ground forces that 
leads to flexibility and mission success.40  The document recognizes ISTAR, as a “critical 
combat multiplier.”41  ISTAR provides a multitude of intelligence gathering capabilities, to 
include full motion video in multi-spectral ranges and signals intelligence, and can 
provide these capabilities during all phases of an operation.  Not only does this allow for 
enhanced mission planning and execution, it provides crucial intelligence for the overall 
strategic-level picture. 
A NATO Industrial Advisory Group was formed in 2008 to examine the 
requirements associated with infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of NATO SOF teams.  
The year-long study produced four capability categories for special operations aircraft.  
Each category, beginning with Category I, demands increasing capacity to perform 
specific capabilities.  For example, Category I aircraft must assist the pilot in navigating 
to an objective within three minutes of a pre-planned time.  Category II increases the 
timing requirement to less than two minutes, Category III requires less than one minute, 
and Category IV requires less than thirty seconds. These categories can be seen in 
Figure 3 and provide guidance for those capabilities required of special operations 
aviation forces, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing. 
 
                                                 
39 NSHQ, “Special Operations Air Group,” 8. 
40 NSHQ, “Special Operations Air Group,” 9. 
41 NSHQ, “Special Operations Air Group,” 10. 
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Figure 3.   NATO SOF Aviation Capability Categories.42 
Requirements for special operations aviation capabilities are varied and 
numerous, setting them apart from most conventional aviation forces.  Several of the 
categorical capabilities in Figure 3 speak more to aviator capabilities than to aircraft type.  
Most current aircraft possess an array of enhanced navigational instruments, such as 
global positioning system and gauges that help identify aircraft attitudes in poor 
visibility.  These instruments give pilots the opportunity for precision navigation and time 
control, and increase situational awareness during dust-out landings—with enough 
training most pilots will be able to meet even the Category IV performance standards in 
these areas.  Aircraft selection narrows when identifying aircraft that must meet several 
other requirements identified in Figure 3, such as troop capacity, landing on unprepared 
strips, and precision airdrop capability. 
C. SURVEY RESULTS 
The author conducted survey research over three months using both electronic 
and paper surveys, and acquired sixty-three total responses.  The survey sample consisted 
                                                 
42 Kisner, “Kindelan Speech,” slide 12. 
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of NATO Special Operations Headquarters personnel, multinational special operations 
forces who have conducted special operations in support of NATO, and international 
students at the Naval Postgraduate School who have NATO special operations experience.  
The survey was designed to capture demographic information to establish a baseline level 
of experience among respondents, and to investigate (1) the aviation preferences of the 
respondents informed by their NATO SOF experience, and (2) the approximate number of 
troops for a given of special operations missions performed by the respondents.  
Personnel experience, and identification of ideal aircraft based on that experience, will 
yield the aircraft type and capability requirements.  The special operations missions are 
categorized by the NATO SOF principal tasks. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Basic Demographics. 
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Table 5.   NATO and U.S. Equivalent Ranks. 
A high level of experience among the respondents is considered by the author as 
an indicator of well-informed responses, as determined by military rank, years of service, 
military specialty, and whether or not the respondents had performed the NATO SOF 
principal tasks.  Under these criteria, the respondent sample consisted of a wide range of 
experience.  The officer ranks ranged from OF-1 to OF-6, and enlisted ranks ranged from 
OR-2 to OR-9; NATO ranks and their U.S. military equivalent can be seen in Table 5.  
Most officer respondents held the rank of OF-3 or OF-4 (65.1% of all officer ranks), with 
the average officer rank being OF-3, while most enlisted respondents held the rank of 
OR-8 (37.5% of all enlisted ranks), with the average enlisted rank being OR-7.  
Respondent years of service ranged from four to more than thirty, and had an average of 
19.33 years of service (18.65 for the officers, 21.27 for the enlisted).  The respondents 
ranged in age from 26 years old to over 55 years old, with an approximate average age of 
at least 40 years old (the average age value is approximated because three of the 
respondents answered “55+,” with no further indication of their exact age—the value of 
55 was used in the average, which yielded a value of 40.2 years of age).  Demographic 
results of the survey can be seen in Figure 4. 
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Figure 5.   Specialties and NATO SOF Principal Tasks. 
Respondent military specialties and experience with NATO SOF principal tasks are 
depicted in Figure 5.  Many of the respondents served as a Tactical SOF Operator/Leader 
or Operations Officer (47.5%). An overwhelming majority of the respondents had 
performed one or more of the principal tasks: 74.5% had performed direct action, 72.5% 
had performed special reconnaissance and surveillance, and 80.4% had performed 
military assistance.  One civilian respondent had five years of service in training and 
education.  In the author’s opinion, the overall experience level of the respondent sample 
appears to be high, indicating the survey responses to be well-informed.   
Following the capture of demographic information, the respondents were asked 
how many missions of each principal task they had performed, and then to prioritize 
rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and ISTAR aviation platforms within each principal task.  ISTAR 
platforms were further scrutinized to provide preferences of manned or unmanned assets.  
The survey also asked respondents to recall personnel numbers and aircraft types that 
were associated with those missions.  The responses permitted this study to first identify 
which principal tasks were performed the most by the respondents, then whether or not 
rotary-wing was desired over fixed-wing, and finally what size of airframe would be 
required to support each type of mission.  In sum, the types and number of airframes 
contributed to the optimal mix of a NATO SOF Air Wing that could successfully execute 
the assigned NATO SOF principal tasks. 
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1. Principal Task Experience 
Survey questions regarding the number of missions completed and the number of 
troops performing those missions asked the respondents to categorize their data by 
numerical groups, with the choices being 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–35, 
36–40, 41–45, 46–50, and 51+ (more than 51).  Figure 6 indicates the approximate 
number of missions performed by the respondents for each principal task.  Direct action 
and special reconnaissance and surveillance had the highest average, with approximately 
16–20 missions completed, followed by military assistance with approximately 11–15 
missions completed.  As one can see in Figure 6, several respondents performed more 
than 51 missions in each of the principal tasks, indicating a very high level of experience. 
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Figure 6.   Approximate Number of Missions Performed for each Principal Task. 
2.   Preferred and Ideal Aircraft 
For each of the three principal tasks, the respondents were asked to rank aviation 
platform types—rotary-wing, light and medium fixed-wing, and ISTAR—relative to their 
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perceived importance during the mission.  The ranks were 1 through 4, with 1 being the 
most important, and 4 being the least important.  The results are shown in Table 6.  In all 
three principal task categories, rotary-wing aircraft were overwhelmingly perceived to be 
the most important platform.  ISTAR ranked second in all three, while medium and light 
fixed-wing aircraft were ranked third and fourth, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6.   Perceived Aviation Platform Importance Relative to Principal Task. 
Survey respondents were also asked to respond to a statement regarding their 
preference for rotary-wing or fixed-wing aviation support during NATO SOF missions; this 
statement instituted a Likert response scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being “Strongly Disagree,” 
4 being “Neutral,” and 7 being “Strongly Agree.”  The results are shown in Table 7.  This 
study found that respondents desired rotary-wing aviation support over fixed-wing 
aviation support when performing missions during each of the three principal tasks, with 
values of 6.22, 5.44, and 6.00 for DA, SR, and MA, respectively.  In fact, of all the 
responses combined for each of the principal tasks, only three total respondents (2.9%) 
disagreed with the statement “I prefer rotary-wing over fixed-wing aircraft for [these] 
missions;” all of the other responses were “Neutral” or some form of agreement, with 
42.6% choosing the response “Strongly Agree.” 
 
 
Table 7.   Preferred Aviation Platform Preference Relative to Principal Task. 
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Survey respondents were then asked to list their ideal aircraft for DA, SR, and 
MA missions.  These results were categorized as “rotary-wing,” “fixed-wing,” or “both”; 
“both” meant the respondent perceived both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft to be 
ideal for the mission.  The responses for MA were not included in the final results 
because, as several respondents pointed out, a military assistance mission’s ideal aircraft 
depends on the nation to which the assistance is being provided, and the aircraft are 
tailored to that nation’s requirements.  Ideal aircraft for DA and SR missions would be 
suitable to most environments.  A single proportion test for significance (α = .05) was 
performed to determine the percentage of time respondents felt both rotary-wing and 
fixed-wing aircraft were ideal for the mission.  Statistical analysis leads to the conclusion 
that respondents felt both aircraft were ideal 23.58% of the time; this significance value 
solidifies the need for both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft.  Full statistical analysis 
calculations can be seen in the Appendix. 
Further examination of the data showed that 62% of respondents felt only rotary-
wing aircraft were ideal, 5.17% felt only fixed-wing aircraft were ideal, and 32.7% felt 
that both were ideal.  Figure 7 shows the intersection of these categorized responses.  
When the raw data is combined, the results reveal the mix of airframes to be 71.4% 
rotary-wing and 28.6% fixed-wing.  It should be noted that of the sixty three total survey 
respondents, there were fifty eight responses to this portion of the survey.  Although not 
all respondents participated in this section, the high experience level of the participating 
respondents underpins these results. 
 
Figure 7.   Ratio of Aircraft. 
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3. Troop Capacity 
To accurately determine the size of platform needed to support NATO SOF, the 
respondents were asked to approximate the average number of troops on missions 
supporting each of the principal tasks.  These results are depicted in Figure 8.  Direct 
action required the highest number of average troops per mission at 26–30, followed by 
military assistance at 21–25 troops, and then special reconnaissance and surveillance at 
6–10 troops per mission.   
 
Figure 8.   Average Number of Troops per Mission. 
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4. Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, and Reconnaissance 
The survey respondents were asked to respond to a set of three statements 
regarding their perceptions of ISTAR support for NATO SOF missions.  This set of 
statements used a Likert response scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being “Strongly Disagree,” 
4 being “Neutral,” and 7 being “Strongly Agree.”  The left side of Figure 9 shows the 
results of these preferences.  The respondents indicated very strongly (6.82) that ISTAR is, 
indeed, important in supporting NATO SOF principal tasks.  They also indicated very 
strongly (6.23) that additional ISTAR support is needed for their missions. Finally, the 
respondents indicated a slight preference (4.46) for unmanned ISTAR assets over manned 
ISTAR assets. 
When asked to list ideal aircraft for the DA and SR principal tasks (MA was 
excluded in these calculations for the reasons stated previously), the respondents 
indicated a heavy preference for unmanned aerial systems over manned aerial systems.  
Of the thirty-four respondents, twenty-four (70.6%) indicated the desire for unmanned 
and ten indicated their preference for manned (29.4%); of those, four respondents 
indicated the desire for both unmanned and manned platforms. 
 
 
Figure 9.   ISTAR Preferences. 
The right side of Figure 9 shows the results when survey respondents were asked 
about their preferences of regarding manned and unmanned ISTAR during four phases of a 
planned objective; an objective in this case is a mission utilizing the direct action 
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principal task.  The phases of the objective were categorized as forty eight hours prior to 
the mission, twenty four hours prior to the mission, three hours prior to the mission, and 
during the mission itself.   “PoL,” or Pattern of Life, describes personnel actions observed 
by ISTAR aviation platforms at the objective.  The right side of Figure 9 indicates a need 
for both manned and unmanned ISTAR support, although it is clear that unmanned ISTAR 
is desired up to three hours prior to direct action, and manned is highly desired while on 
the objective.  The preference for manned ISTAR while performing the mission at the 
objective indicates the need for the flexibility and situational awareness inherent in 
manned ISTAR platforms at a critical phase of the mission.  Respondents were split 
between manned and unmanned ISTAR three hours prior to the mission. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Three key documents provided insight to NATO SOF Air Wing requirements: 
(1) the NSHQ Special Warfare Manual, (2) the 2010 NSHQ Special Operations Air Group 
Concept for Development and Organization, and (3) the NATO Industrial Advisory Group 
Study.  Between them, the documents provided guidelines for aviation platform 
requirements; the two common themes among all were Air Transport and Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Targeting, and Reconnaissance capabilities.  Air Transport capabilities were 
identified as infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply, and required the ability to move 
between four and twenty four troops. 
The survey administered to NATO special operations forces yielded key statistics 
in further determining Air Wing requirements.  The respondents were determined to be 
highly experienced with the survey content.  Among the respondents, the NATO SOF 
principal tasks of direct action and special reconnaissance and surveillance were 
performed more often than military assistance, and a large majority perceives rotary-wing 
aircraft to be more ideal than fixed-wing aircraft.  However, the overwhelming preference 
for rotary-wing aircraft does not suggest that a rotary-wing-only fleet of aircraft should 




conclusion that at times, both rotary-wing and fixed-wing platforms are required.  The 
results of multiple survey questions indicated that the mix of aircraft should be 
71.4% rotary-wing and 28.6% fixed-wing. 
The survey results also yielded information regarding ISTAR platforms.  The 
respondents indicated that ISTAR is extremely important to the success of their missions, 
and that additional ISTAR capabilities are needed.  The data showed that unmanned aerial 
systems were desired more than manned aerial systems, and that the majority of target 
development leading up to actions on the objective would be performed by unmanned 
assets; however, the requirement for both unmanned and manned aerial systems exists.  
The results indicated the heaviest demand for manned ISTAR platforms is during actions 











IV. AIR FLEET OPTIMIZATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
NATO SOF defines Special Operations Air Task Unit as a “tactical-level group of 
special operations forces air and aviation elements capable of supporting or conducting 
special operations.”43  One or more SOATUs comprise the Special Operations Air Task 
Group (SOATG), which in turn, make up the NATO SOF Air Wing.  NATO’s current level 
of ambition is to conduct simultaneous joint military operations, which would require the 
use of SOATUs and SOATGs in large-scale and small-scale contingency operations.44  It is 
important to determine the differences in requirements between large-scale and small-
scale contingencies, as well as a reasonable expectation of how many contingencies 
NATO can expect to conduct simultaneously.  NATO’s military operations over the past 
decade provide a guideline for a reasonable ratio of large-scale to small-scale 
contingencies, and in turn, SOATU and SOATG employment.  
Determining the difference between large-scale contingencies and small-scale 
contingencies is a difficult task because of all the different aspects that comprise any 
contingency.  A Cornwallis Group’s study of NATO’s small-scale contingency operations 
echoes this assessment by saying that, during the study, their group “[argued] that the 
scope is so broad that any definition would be hopelessly unsatisfactory.”45 The 
geographic size and scope of operations, as well as the number of troops committed, and 
by whom, all play a part in determining the scale of an operation.  NATO operations in 
Afghanistan, for example, cover a large geographic area.  The scale of operations spans 
both direct and indirect methods, contains several objectives, and uses a wide range of 
resources to accomplish missions.  Many NATO troops are involved, as well as non-NATO 
                                                 
43 Allied Joint Publication 3.5, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations,” January (2009): LEX-
5. 
44 W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry, “NATO Command Structure: Considerations for the 
Future,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, September 
(2010): 3. 
45 David W. Watson, “Analysis of Small-Scale Contingency Operations: NATO Study SAS-027,” 
accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.thecornwallisgroup.org/pdf/CVI_2001_Mason.pdf. 
 38
troops, and the largest troop contingent is supplied by the United States.  This study 
classifies the operations in Afghanistan as a large-scale contingency.  By contrast, the 
scale of NATO operations in Libya in 2011 was small.  When compared to Afghanistan, 
the number of committed troops was minor, the geographic area of the conflict was small, 
and the scope of operations and their objectives were limited.  This study classifies this 
type of operation as small scale. 
 
 
Figure 10.   NATO Military Operations 2002–2012. 
Figure 10 shows a timeline of NATO military operations, 2002–2012.  Of these 
operations, this study classifies only Afghanistan as a major conflict, due to the 
geographic size and the scope of the operations conducted.  The rest of the operations are 
classified by this study as small scale.  Operations Active En-eavor and Ocean Shield, 
while considered small scale and are still ongoing, will not be included as part of the 
guideline—these operations utilize ship-based air assets vice air assets that will be 
associated with the NATO SOF Air Wing.  One can see that at any time over the previous 
decade of military operations, NATO has been involved in one large-scale contingency 
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and up to four small-scale contingencies at any given time.  The total number of NATO 
SOATGs and SOATUs will be based on this observation. 
 After discussion with several members of the NATO SOF community that have 
served multiple tours in Afghanistan, this study came to the conclusion that two SOATUs 
may be required to support operations in the southern portion of the country, and one 
SOATU may be required in the eastern portion.46  An additional SOATU can shift between 
operations in the north and west as necessary, for a total of four SOATUs for this large-
scale contingency.  Large-scale contingencies, as previously stated, often have troops 
committed from other nations; while the United States commits troops to Afghanistan 
under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, it conducts many unilateral 
operations, and has a robust special operations aviation force within the region.  In the 
event additional air assets are needed during large-scale contingencies, NATO SOF may be 
able to garner support from non-NATO forces on a case-by-case basis until a more 
permanent solution is found.  Small-scale contingencies do not require as many SOATUs 
to support NATO special operations forces—a single SOATU would be able to provide 
adequate special operations aviation capability. 
One large-scale and four small-scale contingencies, then, would require eight 
Special Operations Air Task Units. The SOATUs would constitute several Special 
Operations Air Task Groups, which are inherently scalable and will be tailored to meet 
the requirements of the conflict.  Including a SOATU permanently dedicated to training at 
the NSHQ, the NATO SOF Air Wing is composed of nine SOATUs. 
B. SOATU COMPLEMENT—ROTARY WING AND FIXED-WING 
The number of required troops for each mission in support of the principal tasks 
drives the air support requirement.  Key NATO documents indicate the required number of 
troops for its missions is between four and twenty-four, with sixteen troops stated in 
multiple documents.  Survey data indicated that, of the three NATO SOF principal tasks,  
 
                                                 
46 NATO Special Operations Forces officers, in discussion with the author, March 9, 2012. 
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direct action had the highest approximate average of 26–30 troops; the survey data also 
indicated that the number at the high end of the direct action troop requirement spectrum 
holds an average of 36–40.  The limiting factor from the troop requirement analysis is 
forty troops; this number will be used as the troop planning requirement.  While forty 
troops is a significant number for planning, one must also take into account the 
accompanying equipment.  Equipment such as communications gear, rucksacks, and 
weapons require space and must be considered. 
Chapter II of this study stated parameters for different variants of rotary-wing and 




Table 8.   Rotary-Wing and Fixed-Wing Variants. 
The troop and payload capacities of the medium-lift and heavy-lift rotary-wing 
airframes make them the best selection for the stated requirements of infiltration, 
exfiltration, and resupply.  Based on the span of examples provided in Table 8, forty 
troops and their equipment will require an average of three medium-lift rotary-wing  
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assets or two heavy-lift assets.  A single medium fixed-wing asset would be able to 
account for the entire DA force and their equipment in the event the infiltration or 
exfiltration site meets minimum landing surface requirements.  Light fixed-wing assets 
can be considered, but would require more than four aircraft based on their limited 
payload capacity; for this reason, it is not advantageous to select light fixed-wing aircraft. 
In the author’s experience with aviation, maintenance issues periodically arise 
with many aircraft, causing mission change, delay, or cancellation. This study 
recommends that one additional medium-lift rotary-wing asset and one additional fixed-
wing asset are added to the SOATU to hedge against the loss of a platform due to 
maintenance requirements.  These additional aircraft bring the total to four medium-lift 
rotary-wing platforms, two heavy-lift rotary-wing platforms, and two medium fixed-wing 
platforms.  Six total rotary-wing and two fixed-wing aircraft yield a 75% to 25% split; 
these percentages are very close to the survey results of 71.4% to 28.6% ratio of ideal 
aircraft identified in Chapter III.  ISTAR platforms will be identified in the next section. 
Multiple types of airframes will give the Special Operations Task Unit the added 
ability to conduct simultaneous operations.  For example, one or two (depending on 
equipment requirements) heavy-lift assets can support the forty troops needed for a large 
direct action mission.  Of the four remaining medium-lift assets, several can be used to 
conduct another direct action mission at the same time, or conduct infiltration/exfiltration 
of special reconnaissance and surveillance team.  The fixed-wing assets can also provide 
infiltration capabilities, as well as aerial resupply to teams already in the field.  When not 
being utilized in direct support of the principal tasks, the medium fixed-wing assets can 
provide general air transport, day or night, to unimproved runways in adverse weather 
conditions. 
The NSHQ will require aircraft on which to train their aircrews, as well as support 
exercises and other events which develop habitual training relationships between NATO 
SOF aviation and NATO SOF ground and maritime personnel.  The most advantageous 




create scenarios in garrison that mimic those at operational locations.  An operational 
direct action mission requiring the use of four medium-lift rotary-wing platforms flying 
in formation demands that aircrews train to that capability in garrison, either in learning 
the task or maintaining proficiency in the task.  In order to foster the optimal training 
environment, this study recommends a full Special Operations Air Task Unit complement 
of four medium-lift rotary-wing, two heavy-lift rotary-wing, and two medium fixed-wing 
aircraft remain permanently in garrison under NSHQ command and control. 
C. SOATU COMPLEMENT—ISTAR PLATFORMS 
NATO documents state a clear desire for increased ISTAR capabilities organic to 
NATO SOF.  The NATO SOF Air Wing survey results echoed that desire, and indicated that 
both unmanned and manned platforms are required; unmanned platforms for target 
development and manned platforms during operational execution.  Persistent target 
development requires uninterrupted ISTAR capabilities.   
1. Unmanned ISTAR Platforms 
As stated in Chapter II, unmanned ISTAR platforms have the capability of long 
loiter times.  Loiter time is dependent upon the type of unmanned platform.  For example, 
platforms like General Atomics’ MQ-1 Predator or the Boeing Scan Eagle can provide 
persistent coverage overhead a designated target twenty four hours a day by alternating 
between just two platforms, while other, smaller platforms have a loiter time of just a few 
hours.  The larger platforms, due to their size, also have the ability to carry heavier 
weapons in the event they are needed for a strike mission.  Loiter time and weaponization 
are two factors that should heavily influence the type of unmanned ISTAR platforms being 
considered.  Like rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial systems are 






Assuming increased loiter time, the ability to weaponize the platform, this study 
recommends a minimum of three unmanned ISTAR platforms per Special Operations Air 
Task Group; this allows for two alternating platforms for persistent ISTAR coverage over 
an objective, and one additional platform to hedge against maintenance issues 
2.   Manned ISTAR Platforms 
Manned ISTAR systems provide the advantages of better communication gear and 
faster transit time between multiple objectives, and can fly in degraded weather 
conditions.  They also have increased situational awareness while overhead the objective, 
and can quickly adapt to changing operational conditions.  However, unlike unmanned 
platforms, manned ISTAR aircraft will only be able to stay overhead the objective for just 
several hours, depending on the distance from its base of origin.  For example, the MC-
12W manned ISR aircraft advertises an eight-hour endurance time.47  If the transit time to 
and from the target is an hour each way, the aircraft will only be able to remain overhead 
the objective between four and four and a half hours, as the aircraft must land with 
required fuel reserves.  If the direct action mission lasts longer than the manned platform 
can remain overhead, the ground force must accept an unmanned platform for the 
remainder of the mission, increasing risk of mission success. 
This study recommends two manned platforms per SOATG due to the 
overwhelming desire to have manned ISTAR assets overhead when on the objective.  This 
will permit a greater chance of manned coverage if the mission lasts longer than 
expected, and it permits one backup aircraft in the event the other one is inoperative due 
to maintenance issues.  To maintain consistency with the SOATG operational complement, 
the NSHQ training unit also requires two manned ISTAR platforms and three unmanned 
platforms. 
                                                 
47 “MC-12W Liberty, “United States of America,” accessed March 2, 2012, http://www.airforce-
technology.com/projects /mc-liberty/. 
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D.  CONCLUSION 
Whether an operational NATO Special Operations Air Task Unit or its training 
complement at the NATO Special Operations Headquarters, the consistency remains the 
same, and is depicted in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.   Recommended Special Operations Air Task Unit. 
As previously stated, the NATO SOF Air Wing will require nine SOATUs based on 
meeting the study-defined requirements of one large-scale contingency, four small-scale 
contingencies, and the training unit.  The full complement of the NATO SOF Air Wing is 
depicted in Table 10. 
 
Table 10.   Recommended NATO SOF Air Wing. 
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Should NATO define its simultaneous conflict level of ambition as greater or 
fewer, the number of SOATUs can be scaled accordingly.  In addition, it should be noted 
that the NSCC Special Operations Task Group Manual defines a SOATG as a “national 
grouping of special air operations capabilities;” a NATO SOF Air Wing may consist of 
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V. TRAINING AND READINESS ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
A. OVERVIEW 
An optimized NATO Special Operations Air Wing requires a commensurate 
training and readiness organizational structure.  Much of the literature addressing the 
organizational construct of NATO SOF aviation does so in the sense of command and 
control of deployed units—very operations-centric analyses.  However, there appears to 
be a lack of literature that addresses an organizational construct within NATO SOF 
Headquarters that is able to maintain the training and readiness functions that are integral 
to successful employment of an aviation wing.  This chapter addresses that shortfall by 
first analyzing the NSHQ organizational structure, followed by an analysis of Air Force 
Special Operations Command’s primary training organization, the Air Force Special 
Operations Training Center, and the characteristics that have led it to be an effective 
organization.  Finally, a recommendation will be made that will enable NSHQ to train its 
aircrew members so that a habitual and effective relationship can be maintained between 
NATO SOF aviation forces and its ground and maritime forces, thereby increasing chances 
for operational mission success. 
B. NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE 
NATO SOF Headquarters mission and vision statements project the importance of 
“optimizing” special operations forces—efficient and effective use of SOF.49  The vision 
statement conveys the sense that collaboration and quick, self-sufficient employment 
across a full range of activities are the most important facets of the organization as it 




                                                 
49 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “NATO Special Operations Headquarters,” delivered 
August 11, 2011, by NSHQ personnel. 
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NSHQ Mission 
The NSHQ is the primary point of development, direction and coordination 
for all NATO Special Operations related activities in order to optimize 
employment of Special Operations Forces to include providing an 
operational command capability when directed by SACEUR. 
 
NSHQ Vision 
An Allied and Partner Collaborative Network, connected via a global 
secure communications system, able to rapidly generate multiple 
interoperable scaled force packages with organic command, control, 
communications, and intelligence assets, and capable of performing full 
spectrum special operations across the range of military operations to 
achieve strategic and operational effects in support of SACEUR and 
Alliance politico-military objectives. 
 
The NATO SOF Headquarters is organized to support the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR), U.S. Admiral James Stavridis.  As SACEUR, ADM 
Stavridis is in charge of NATO’s military arm which is divided into two distinct 
commands—the Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk, VA, and the Allied 
Command Operations, based in Brussels, Belgium.  ACO is further divided into four 
separate headquarters—Joint Force Headquarters Brunssom, Joint Force Headquarters 
Lisbon, Joint Force Headquarters Naples, and NATO Special Operations Headquarters.  
NSHQ is a force provider to the three Joint Force Headquarters upon the direction of 
SACEUR.  The SACEUR and NSHQ organizations are shown in Figures 11 and 12—the 






Figure 11.   NATO Allied Command Operations. 
 
 
Figure 12.   NATO Special Operations Headquarters. 
 
NSHQ, like many organizations, has an open system of inputs, transformation 
processes, and outputs.  In fact, each of the three divisions within NSHQ are systems 
themselves.  Specifically, the Training and Readiness Division uses all three of its 
directorates as its own internal transformation system to deliver a product; this directorate 
is shown as a system in Figure 13.  The inputs consist of people, equipment, financial and 
material resources, and the NATO SOF principal tasks.  NATO SOF’s three principal tasks, 
direct action, special reconnaissance and surveillance, and military assistance, outline its 
broad scope of responsibility. 
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The middle arrow in Figure 13 is the virtual location where inputs are transformed 
to outputs.  This transformation process occurs at three different levels.50  The highest, or 
largest, of these exists at the group level, and is called NSTEP—the NATO SOF Training 
and Education Program, located on the NATO SOF Campus at Chièvres Air Base, 
Belgium.  This program runs several courses for NATO SOF personnel that develop 
professionals in various areas, among which are operations, technical exploitation, joint 
operating centers, intelligence, and planning.  NSTEP uses its cadre of instructors at the 
individual level, who, in turn, use training modules with specific tasks, conditions, and 
standards as measures of performance at the task level. 
 
Figure 13.   NSHQ Training and Readiness System.51 
 
The final product from the transformation is a body of fully trained personnel, 
able to serve in NATO SOF in his or her respective area of expertise, with other trained 
professionals from other NATO SOF nations.  The experience gained from operating in 
real world conditions serves as another input—this time through a feedback loop.  The 
intent is to alter, or reinforce, the transformation process based on the lessons learned 
                                                 
50 David P. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1988), 12. 
51 Hanna, Designing Organizations, 19. 
 51
from experience.  This professional will also return to his or her own country, and apply 
the knowledge within that nation’s military forces. 
C. AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER 
1. Overview 
The Air Force Special Operations Training Center (AFSOTC) is located at Hurlburt 
Field, Florida.  AFSOTC’s mission and vision statements were obtained from AFSOC’s 
official website, and are shown below.52  The underlying theme of AFSOTC is that it uses 
its training and education programs to develop elite Air Force special operations 
personnel—Air Commandos and their enablers—from conventional Air Force airmen. 
 
AFSOTC Mission 
Recruit, assess, select, indoctrinate, educate, and train Air Commandos, 
other special operations forces, and SOF enablers. 
 
AFSOTC Vision 
Transforming airmen into Air Commandos who possess the specialized 
skills and warrior ethos to fight and win anytime, anywhere. 
2. Organizational Structure 
AFSOTC is organized to support the Commander of Air Force Special Operations 
Command.  The AFSOC Commander is in charge of the 23rd Air Force, four Special 
Operations Wings, four Special Operations Groups, and AFSOTC.  In turn, the Numbered 
Air Force, Wings, Groups, and AFSOTC each consist of numerous squadrons and 
detachments.  AFSOC is the Air Force component of U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM).  Like NSHQ to the Joint Force Commands, USSOCOM is a force provider to 
the U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands upon direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.  The major organizational units of USSOCOM and AFSOC can be seen in Figures 
14 and 15, respectively. 
                                                 




Figure 14.   United States Special Operations Command Components. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Air Force Special Operations Command. 
 
AFSOTC was established on October 6, 2008, in an effort to separate training from 
operations.  Prior to AFSOTC, the execution of a majority of training fell to the individual 
operational flying squadrons.  Necessarily, operational demands took priority over 
training demands, leaving fewer and fewer resources to conduct training—this degraded 
state of training resulted in inadequate aircrew member production.  Considering the 
elevated operations tempo experienced by AFSOC over the past decade, the impact of this 
inadequate production was felt throughout the entire Command.  Then-AFSOC 
Commander Lieutenant General Donald C. Wurster envisioned an environment where 
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“trainers train, and warfighters fight.”53  By separating training and operations, training 
would receive its due share of dedicated aircrew members, aircraft, and other resources 
with which to conduct efficient, effective training.  AFSOTC was established with Colonel 
Paul E. Harmon as its first Commander, and immediately began realizing its vision: 
“Transforming airmen into Air Commandos.” 
Like NSHQ, AFSOTC has an open system of inputs, transformation processes, and 
outputs, which is shown in Figure 16. The inputs consist of people, equipment, resources, 
and AFSOC mission requirements.  Mission requirements are driven by the operational 
needs of the entire U.S special operations community; these operational needs are 
necessary to conduct “special operations activities,” as defined by Section 167 of United 
States Code, Title 10. These activities include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, 
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional 
warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, 
information operations, military information support operations, and civil affairs.54  For 
instance, if a mission requires a special operations team to be inserted by high altitude 
airdrop, AFSOC needs to develop the supporting capability—that requirement is an input 
to the transformation process.  Other mission requirements include takeoff and landing to 
and from unimproved fields (e.g., a dirt landing strip), night vision goggle flying, and 
operating a door gun on specific aircraft; this list is not all-inclusive. 
                                                 
53 Michael A. McNerney (Deputy Commander, Air Force Special Operations Training Center), 
interview with the author, February 8, 2012. 
54 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations,” Washington, D.C. (2011), II-6. 
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Figure 16.   AFSOTC Transformation Process. 
The middle arrow in Figure 16 is the transformation process, which occurs at 
three different levels.  The highest level is the entire AFSOTC organization—all of the 
squadrons and detachments working toward a common goal.  For example, AFSOTC’s 
Combat Aviation Advisor (CAA) curriculum transforms an aircrew member through four 
phases of education and training, taking approximately seven months to complete.  Using 
Figure 17 as a reference, Phase I includes introductory education, which occurs at the 
United States Special Operations School.  Phase II is practical training that builds on 
Phase I, and is conducted by the 371st Special Operations Combat Training Squadron.  
Phase III is language training conducted at the Language Center, and Phase IV is flying 
training on fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, conducted by the 19th Special Operations 
Squadron.  The final product is a special operations airman—an Air Commando.  CAA is 
just one example of how AFSOTC transforms its inputs to outputs. 
AFSOTC continually updates its transformation process through formal and 
informal feedback loops.  The formal feedback loops include periodic critiques as 
students progress throughout courses, supervisor inputs regarding student progress, post-
course critiques, and a biannual formal course review.  The formal course review focuses 
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on the effectiveness of the syllabi of instruction, which can be reorganized in order to 
meet any changes in demand.55  Informal feedback occurs at the individual level, mostly 
through squadron commanders, and through the use of operational squadron instructors 
on periodic flights.  Discussion of student progress during these informal forums results 
in candid feedback that contributes to tweaking the transformation process when needed. 
 
 
Figure 17.   AFSOTC Organizational Chart. 
3. Professionalization and Efficiencies 
Since its organizational standup in 2008, AFSOTC has alleviated some of the 
training issues that previously plagued AFSOC—not enough training resources, 
inadequate dedicated instruction, and degraded training outputs.  Several years into its 
existence, particular aspects of AFSOTC should be highlighted, as much to identify areas 
that appear to be a benchmark for any Major Command’s training organization—the 
professionalization of the cadre—as well as those that indicate areas for improvement—
efficiencies. 
Perhaps the most important activity of the AFSOTC organization is the 
development of its cadre of instructors.  In fact, Colonel McNerney cites this as one of 
AFSOTC’s best attributes.56  Consistent with the vision for its existence—“trainers train, 
                                                 
55 McNerney, interview with the author, February 8, 2012. 
56 McNerney, interview with the author, February 8, 2012. 
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warfighters fight”—is the fact that personnel come to AFSOTC and become professional 
trainers.  Aircrew members that are instructors in a typical special operations flying 
squadron must balance instruction with various additional duties, dividing attention 
between teaching and myriad other tasks.  AFSOTC instructors, however, are able to 
maintain focus solely on instruction—dedicating all their time to students, becoming 
expert trainers in the process, and producing the best product possible.  Dr. Julia 
Crutchfield, AFSOTC Director of Curriculum and Faculty Development, cites the AFSOTC 
Methods of Instruction Course (which is recognized by the Community College of the 
Air Force and the American Council on Education) as the foundation for instructor 
development, and outlines the professionalization process:  
Once the instructor has completed [the] methodology course, he or she is 
entered into a 180 hour supervised teaching internship…followed by 
annual subject matter testing, an annual evaluation and at least 15 clock 
hours of professional development per year.57   
Professional development are those activities that help the instructor maintain proficiency 
in a particular subject matter expert skill set or enhancement of instructor methods and 
skills, and include, but are not limited to, professional military education, occupational 
instructor certification, and instructional systems development certification.58 
On the other hand, one of the most difficult challenges AFSOTC faces is a result of 
the “resource neutral” manner in which it was stood up.  “Resource neutral” means that 
the organization had to build itself up from existing billets and personnel—spaces and 
faces—from within AFSOC. Colonel Harmon notes that the biggest issue was 
manpower—“We started out with one person as the AFSOTC staff.  I finally got spaces, 
but then had to wait for the faces.”59  Those faces finally came by shrinking the personnel 
 
 
                                                 
57 Dr. Julia I. Crutchfield (Director, Curriculum and Faculty Development, Air Force Special 
Operations Training Center), electronic mail interview with the author, February 15, 2012. 
58 Air Force Special Operations Training Center, “AFSOTC Instruction 36-8: Instructor Qualification, 
Certification, and Evaluation,” October (2010), 8. 
59 Paul E. Harmon (first Commander, Air Force Special Operations Training Center), interview with 
the author, February 9, 2012. 
 57
requirements of other units, forcing those units to do more with less.  Eventually, AFSOTC 
gained enough personnel to begin performing the training functions for which it was 
designed. 
This concept of “resource neutrality” leads to another issue, that of efficiencies 
versus effectiveness.  The organization consists of people that are very focused on its 
effectiveness in terms of the products delivered throughout AFSOC.  Sometimes, however, 
this focus can lead the organization to overlook its efficiencies.60  Efficiencies, in this 
case, refers to the backside support that is so crucial to organizational function.  Backside 
support includes everything from curriculum development, to software development, to 
syllabus of instruction development.  Though there have been improvements in backside 
support since October, 2008, more work still needs to be done to completely alleviate the 
shortfall in efficiencies.   
D. PROPOSED CHANGES TO NSHQ 
1. Organizational Structure 
Much of the success of a NATO SOF Air Wing will depend on the capability of 
NSHQ to initiate, grow, and maintain the training pipeline that will produce SOF airmen.  
To do so, NSHQ’s current structure will need to change in a manner that will enable its 
transformation processes to meet the demands of the air wing.  As one can see through 
the analysis of AFSOTC, training airmen requires a robust organization that not only trains 
aircrew members for particular tasks, but underpins that training with backside support 
and other resources.  According to the Military Assistant to the NSHQ Commander, 
Colonel John Cline, and echoed by NSHQ’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Darin Conkright, the 
type of organization needed to mature NATO SOF aviation to its full operational capability 
should be established as a separate entity—an “Air Warfare Center” that is a separate  
 
                                                 
60 McNerney, interview with the author, February 8, 2012. 
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command under NSHQ.61  A separate Air Warfare Center under NSHQ is a mirror image of 
the AFSOTC command relationship within AFSOC, and reflects the importance being given 
to a SOF air capability. 
The Training and Readiness portion of NSHQ contains the J7 (Training and 
Education), J10 (Policy, Doctrine, Capabilities, and Requirements), and J11 
(Assessments, Evaluations, and Exercises) Directorates.  A new “Air Warfare Center” 
requires elements of each of these directorates to contribute to the transformation 
processes, with J7 having the largest responsibility.  J7 contains the Training Branch, the 
Education Branch, and the NATO SOF Training and Education Program Branch.  With the 
initiation of a NATO SOF aviation program, each section of J7 requires resources to meet 
the associated training and education demands. Because J7’s scope of responsibility 
grows immensely under an air wing construct, it warrants an upgrade in the chain of 
command to ensure appropriate advocacy at higher levels of NSHQ.  Currently supervised 
by an OF-4 (U.S. equivalent rank of O-5), the expanded J7 Director billet would require 
an OF-5; an OF-5 rank would effectively put J7 command responsibility on par with the  
Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Support, Operations, and Training and Readiness. 
These two entities—an Air Warfare Center and an expanded J7—would work 
closely together as the NATO SOF Air Wing takes shape.  The current J7 Director, 
Lieutenant Colonel Cory Peterson, envisions an organizational change such that an Air 
Warfare Center and J7 fall under a new umbrella command—the NATO Special Warfare 
Center (NSWC), headed by an OF-6 (U.S. equivalent of O-7, or Brigadier General).62  
The J7 would become the NATO Special Operations School (NSOS), and the Air Warfare 
Center would be the NATO Special Air Warfare School (NSAWS); this organizational 
structure can be seen on the left side of the diagram in Figure 18. J10 and J11 
Directorates are included in Figure 18 to highlight that they have not migrated; also note 
that since J7 has moved to the NSWC, the Training and Readiness Division has been 
                                                 
61 John Cline (Military Assistant to the Commander, NSHQ) and Colonel Darin Conkright (NSHQ 
Chief of Staff), interview with the author, November 9, 2011.  
62 Cory Peterson (Director, J-7, NSHQ), interview and subsequent electronic mail exchange with the 
author, November 9, 2011 through February 17, 2012. 
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renamed “Readiness.”  There are no nationalities associated with the NSWC and its 
divisions because these are notional organizations. 
 
 
Figure 18.   New NSHQ Organizational Structure. 
The Readiness division of NSHQ will have J10 and J11 responsibilities to the 
NSWC.  Current NATO SOF air policy and doctrine is being written in an ad hoc manner 
because there is no established organizational requirement.  This policy and doctrine will 
need to be revised and updated as the air wing takes shape and the Center begins to 
provide direction for its operational air capability. The Center will also require 
assessments, evaluations, and exercises from J11 in order to validate its processes and 
ensure the output is of the desired capability.  I recommend that specific liaisons be 




Figure 19.   NATO Special Warfare Center. 
Figure 19, a detailed view of the proposed NATO Special Air Warfare School, 
indicates the organizational relationship of the optimized fleet of NATO SOF aviation 
platforms.  Under this structure, NSAWS has all fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and ISTAR assets 
at its disposal.  A percentage of the aircraft will always remain in garrison to ensure 
continuity of instruction and training—this percentage will vary with the operational 
requirements of NATO SOF.  Only the flying and support sections of NSAWS are shown in 
this diagram.  NSAWS has the potential for growth, such as the addition of an aircraft 
maintenance squadron.  The type of maintenance available for the aircraft—organic to 
NATO or Contracted Logistics Support—has yet to be determined, and will require further 
research.   
2. Roadmaps and Leadership 
Lessons learned from the standup of the Air Force Special Operations Training 
Center can be transferred to the standup of a similar organization within NSHQ.  Key 
personnel involved in AFSOTC’s standup and growth cite two areas that require detailed 
attention in order for an organization like the NSWC to be successful—these areas are 
growth roadmaps and commander qualities.  
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The resource neutrality with which AFSOTC was initially configured created 
problems with growth.  Only when AFSOTC had gained enough “spaces and faces” was it 
able to carry out its mission effectively.  Both the current and former AFSOTC 
commanders, as well as the deputy commander, advocate defining and identifying early 
growth requirements which can be resourced appropriately.  “Formulate a [Unit Manning 
Document] and stick to it” and “have a roadmap that anticipates future growth and get 
out in front of it” are two pieces of advice that highlight the need for identifying 
personnel requirements and finding a way to resource those requirements before the 
organization takes root.63  These personnel requirements include everything from 
Commander and staff, to backside support, to instructor cadre.  An effective organization 
needs the right number of personnel with the right types of skills to ensure the 
organization’s mission can be effectively carried out. 
Identifying a commander with the right qualities is also paramount for mission 
success.  A new organization with heavy resource requirements will need a person not 
only with vision for the unit, but with the ability to realize that vision.  “Tenacious” and 
“politically savvy” are two terms that Colonel Harmon uses to describe the type of 
commander needed for an AFSOTC-like organization; the commander must be tenacious 
enough to fight for and obtain the necessary resources of the organization and at the same 
time balance that tenacity with political awareness to ensure appropriate top cover.64  
Lieutenant Colonel John Trube, 371 Special Operations Combat Training Squadron 
Commander, feels that a strong background in both operations and programmatics 
enhances a commander’s ability to articulate the organization’s requirements to those 
higher up in the command structure—“constant and proactive engagement [with senior 
officers] helps to ensure that [the unit’s] needs are being assessed and resourced.  
Otherwise, you put trainers and students at risk.”65   
                                                 
63 Alsid and McNerney, interview with the author, February, 2012. 
64 Harmon, interview with the author, February 9, 2012. 
65 John S. Trube (Commander, 371 Special Operations Combat Training Squadron), interview with 
the author, February 8, 2012. 
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3. Aircrew Force Structure 
One of the most important parts of the transformation process in the NSWC will 
be the cadre of aircrew instructors.  These instructors are responsible for ensuring that 
each of the NATO SOF aircrew students are performing tasks to a particular level and 
standardizing the output.  As one anonymous survey respondent noted, “SOF aircrew 
skills are too diverse among NATO members,” indicating the need for an effective training 
pipeline that results in a standardized set of aviation skills.  Whether performing NVG 
landings to unlit runways in austere environments, airdropping supplies to isolated NATO 
special operations teams, or teaching partner nation aircrew members best methods of 
employment for their own aircraft, the quality of the aircrew members—of which the 
foundation is built by the instructors—will have a direct impact on mission success in the 
operational environment. 
Aircrew instructors should be assigned to the NSWC for a minimum of three 
years—this allows NSWC to professionalize the instructor cadre, much the same way 
AFSOTC professionalizes theirs.  The initial period of the assignment allows instructors to 
build teaching and flying skill sets to a level that would permit expert instruction of 
students for the rest of their tenure.  Methods of instruction courses and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures development are just two examples of activities that help to 
build a successful instructor.  Instructors should also complete one operational 
deployment per year.  The survey to NATO SOF personnel discussed in Chapter III of this 
study contained one section for Aircrew Force Structure.  Survey respondents were asked 
to respond to a statement regarding instructor deployments.  On a scale of one to seven, 
with 1 being “Strongly Disagree,” 4 being “Neutral,” and 7 being “Strongly Agree,” 
NATO SOF personnel indicated, with a score of 6.14, that at least one operational 
deployment per year would give the instructor cadre the necessary operational expertise 
to maintain relevant knowledge and skill sets.  Not only would a three-year tour at 
NSWC contribute to a solid foundation for all NATO SOF aircrew members, but the 
instructor would provide his or her national Air Force with the same teaching and flying 
skill set upon return following NSWC tour completion. 
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Aircrew members should also be assigned to NATO for a minimum of three years.  
The habitual training relationship within U.S. SOF breeds mission success, and is a highly 
desirable characteristic for NATO SOF.66  The habitual training relationship between NATO 
SOF aviation and NATO special operations ground and maritime forces can only be 
formed through consistent and dedicated interaction; this interaction will not translate 
into success if the turnover of aircrew is frequent.  Three years allows time for aircrew 
members to be transformed through the NSOS and NSAWS training pipelines and to then 
build the necessary habitual relationship with the rest of NATO SOF.  The NATO SOF Air 
Wing survey asked respondents their opinion on permanent aircrew assignments (three 
years or greater) to NATO.  On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being “Strongly Disagree,” 
4 being “Neutral,” and 7 being “Strongly Agree,” NATO SOF personnel indicated with a 
score of 6.22, that a tour of at least three years would be highly beneficial to the NATO 
SOF Air Wing.  As with instructors, aircrew members bring valuable SOF aviation skills 
back to their nation’s Air Force following a tour at the NATO Special Warfare Center. 
It is important to note that upon completion of an assigned tour at NSWC, 
instructors and aircrew bring SOF aviation skills back to their home nations.  Not only do 
Alliance nations benefit from having these individuals return with SOF aviation skills, but 
the returning members, if needed, can help develop their national special operations 
aviation units to a level commensurate with NATO SOF aviation.  This development is 
particularly beneficial for those nations that may only have a fledgling SOF aviation 
capability. 
                                                 
66 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Special Operations Forces: Key to Mission Success at 
Strategic Level,” NATO SOF Coordination Center (2009) 14. 
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This study makes the following recommendations regarding a proposed NATO SOF 
Air Wing: 
1.  The optimal composition of a Special Operations Air Task Unit is four 
medium-lift rotary-wing aircraft, two heavy-lift rotary-wing aircraft, two medium fixed-
wing aircraft, three unmanned ISTAR aircraft, and two manned ISTAR aircraft.  Nine 
Special Operations Air Task Units are required to comprise a NATO SOF Air Wing. 
2.  The training and readiness organizational structure of NSHQ should change to 
meet the demands of nine Special Operations Air Task Units.  A NATO Special Warfare 
Center should be created, commanded by an OF-6, and should consist of the NATO 
Special Operations School and the NATO Special Air Warfare School.  The NATO Special 
Air Warfare School should contain the necessary flying and support components of the 
proposed NATO SOF Air Wing. 
3.  Further research should be conducted in the following areas: (a) those topics 
already under scrutiny by the Naval Postgraduate School’s NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters Air Capability Study, (b) expansion of the proposed NATO Special Air 
Warfare School, (c) development of an organization that can address subsequent 
shortfalls or urgent requirements in special operations aviation capabilities, and (d) past 
NATO SOF operations that could have benefitted from a dedicated aviation capability. 
1. Optimized Mix of Aircraft 
Chapter II addressed special operations aviation categories by looking at historical 
examples of capabilities, and then defining the different types of airframes within rotary-
wing (light, medium, and heavy-lift), fixed-wing (light, medium, and heavy), and ISTAR 
(unmanned and manned) platforms.  Chapter III addressed NATO SOF Air Wing 
requirements by examining key NATO documents and results of a NATO SOF Air Wing 
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Survey administered by the researcher in person at NSHQ, and electronically to NATO 
Special Operations Headquarters personnel, multinational special operations forces that 
have conducted special operations in support of NATO special operations, and 
international students at the Naval Postgraduate School who have NATO special 
operations experience.  Once the requirements for the Air Wing were determined, this 
study developed the optimal mix of aviation platforms in Chapter IV.  This optimal mix 
of platforms was put into a Special Operations Air Task Unit construct, and consisted of 
four medium-lift rotary-wing aircraft, two heavy-lift rotary-wing aircraft, two medium 
fixed-wing aircraft, and five ISTAR aircraft—three unmanned, and two manned.  This 
study also found that NATO, over the past decade, has conducted one large-scale 
contingency and four small-scale contingencies at any given time, with the large-scale 
contingencies requiring four SOATUs and the small-scale contingencies each requiring 
one SOATU.  Combing these operational SOATUs with the training SOATU permanently 
assigned to the NATO Special Air Warfare School resulted in a total of nine SOATUs for 
the NATO SOF Air Wing. 
2. Organizational Structure 
Chapter V examined the NATO Special Operations Headquarters as an 
organization, focusing primarily on the Training component.  An air wing organic to 
NSHQ will require changes in the NSHQ organization to initiate and mature the air wing to 
full operational capability.  This study proposes the standup of a NATO Special Warfare 
Center, which will house two organizations—the NATO Special Operations School and 
the NATO Special Air Warfare School.  The NSWC will be commanded by an OF-6 and 
the NSOS and NSAWS will each be commanded by an OF-5.  These schools will absorb 
the current NSHQ J7 Directorate, which is composed of Training, Education, and the 
NATO SOF Training and Education Program branches.  Additionally, NSAWS will develop, 
initially, two units—a flying unit that will contain all the flying instruction and associated 
personnel, and a support unit that will develop and maintain the support required to run 
the flying unit.  This organizational structure is based on the United States Air Force 
Special Operations Training Center, located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. 
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3. Further Research 
This study presents a macro-level recommendation for an organic NATO SOF Air 
Wing.  Additional research is required to produce micro-level recommendations as NATO 
SOF aviation begins to take shape.  Already in progress is a team of military faculty and 
students at the Naval Postgraduate School engaging in a project entitled “NATO Special 
Operations Headquarters Air Capability Study.”  This study is receiving support from 
NSHQ, as well as from USSOCOM through its operational planning teams and the Joint 
Special Operations University; initial research will be complete by June 2012.  Submitted 
areas for research are: (a) comparison between conventional and special air warfare 
enablers, (b) optimal organization at the group and wing level, (c) cost-benefit analysis of 
procuring, developing, and employing a multi-mission/multi-use medium sized aircraft, 
(d) cost-benefit analysis of light-to-medium, manned and unmanned fixed-wing 
ISTAR/strike assets, (e) acquisition and sustainment of excess defense article rotary-wing 
assets, (f) basing options for both rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets, and (g) specific 
training requirements for NSHQ aircrew to support NATO SOF.67  Each of these areas 
should be researched by looking through the lens of what NATO considers “Smart 
Defense.”  Smart Defense has been described by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen as not spending more money, but getting more value for the money spent, and 
that Alliance nations must “prioritize, … specialize, and must seek multinational 
solutions.”68  Smart Defense is not just an initiative presented by NATO—it is one fully 
supported by President Obama, and is referenced in the Department of Defense strategic 
guidance found in the recently released “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 
21st Century Defense.”69 
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 68
This study proposes the establishment of the NATO Special Air Warfare School, 
and flying and support organizations within that school.  Further research should be 
conducted that will not only expand the flying and support organizations, but also 
investigate the expansion of the school itself.  For example, the draft NSHQ Special 
Operations Air Group Concept for Development and Organization document and the 
NATO Special Air Warfare Manual address the need for air-land integration (ALI).  
Research should be conducted that will yield an ALI construct that inputs lessons learned 
from existing ALI programs (for instance, the Air Force Special Operations Training 
Center’s 371 Special Operations Combat Training Squadron and Special Operations 
Terminal Attack Controller Course), as well as incorporate applicable guidance from 
NATO Standardized Agreements (such as that found in 3797, “Minimum Qualifications 
for Forward Air Controllers”). 
Once the NSAWS flying organization has matured to full operational capability, 
research should be conducted for the requirement and feasibility of a flying unit or 
support unit that can address subsequent shortfalls or urgent requirements in special 
operations aviation capabilities.  For example, USSOCOM utilizes a Combat Mission Need 
Statement (C-MNS) process to address urgent new or existing materiel requirements as 
they relate to special operations forces; this process “supports expeditious acquisition of 
new or existing materials, normally fielded within 180 days of a C-MNS approval…[and] 
must be sustainable through duration of combat or contingency operations.”70  When a 
NATO SOF aviation-related urgent operational need arises, there should be a comparable 
organization within the NATO Special Air Warfare School that can address it, and develop 
associated aviation tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure the need is met 
successfully. 
This study also recommends further research of previous NATO SOF activities, 
including the analysis of classified information, to determine the effectiveness dedicated 
special operations aviation might have had.  For example, NATO special operations forces 
                                                 
70 Department of Defense, “CJCSI 3470.01—Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent 
Operations Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution,” Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July (2005): A-2. 
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were involved in missions in Bosnia to capture “persons indicted for war crimes.”71 It has 
also been suggested that NATO special operations forces played a part in the military 
success of the 2011 operation in Libya.72 Upon availability, details of NATO SOF 
employment in these operations should be analyzed to determine how a dedicated unit of 
special operations aircraft could have further benefitted NATO SOF as they accomplished 
their missions. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The strategic utility of NATO special operations forces is instrumental in achieving 
and maintaining security not only for the Alliance members, but in regions around the 
globe; an organic NATO special operations aviation capability will increase the 
effectiveness of NATO SOF and enable mission success.  This study, and others like it, 
provide inputs to key leaders in the decision making process.  However, successful 
military capabilities are not established and matured by reading study results—these 
capabilities can only come to fruition through dedication of all the elements that make up 
an organization, be it through providing financial support or manpower, or other 
resources such as aircraft and logistic support.  Indeed, Admiral Stavridis and United 
States Ambassador to NATO Ivo H. Daalder state, “the intervention in Libya … 
demonstrated that a politically cohesive NATO can tackle increasingly complex, and 
increasingly global, security challenges.”73  NATO SOF is a crucial element in tackling 
these complex global security challenges.  The vision of a NATO SOF Air Wing can be 
realized, but only if the collective will of the Alliance members make it so. 
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APPENDIX.  HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
The following table reflects the data from the survey question, “If you could have 
the ideal aircraft for support during [DA and SR] missions, what would it (they) be?”  
This data was used in hypothesis testing to determine whether or not both types of 
aircraft—rotary-wing and fixed-wing—were needed to support the NATO SOF principal 
tasks. 
 DA SR COMBINED 
Only Rotary-Wing 22 14 36 
Only Fixed-Wing 1 2 3 
Both RW and FW 9 10 19 
TOTAL: 58 
Table 11.   Survey Responses—Ideal Aircraft for Mission Type. 
Single proportion tests for significance were conducted to determine the need for 
both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft in support of the NATO SOF principal tasks.  The 
tests started proposed a null hypothesis that respondents claim that there is a need for 
both type of aircraft on at least 10% of the missions, and were conducted in ten-percent 
increments until enough statistical evidence led to the conclusion that both types were not 
needed at that percent.  The tests were conducted at 95% significance (α = .05), and the 
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where z is the test statistic, p is the percentage of the sample that chose both rotary-wing 
and fixed-wing, 0p is the null hypothesis, and n is the number of respondents in the 
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Since 5.77 is greater than the constant significance value of 1.6445, the null hypothesis is 
rejected—that is, respondents requested both types of aircraft on at least 10% of the 
missions.  A significance test using the null hypothesis that respondents claim there is a 
need for both type of aircraft on at least 20% of the missions yielded a value of 2.429, 
which is still greater than 1.6445, so again the null hypothesis was rejected.  This implies 
that respondents requested both type aircrafts at least 20% of the time.  
A significance test with a null hypothesis of at least 30% yielded a value of 
0.4589.  This value is less than the constant significance value of 1.6445; the research 
data failed to reject the null hypothesis.  In this case, there is not enough statistical 
evidence to conclude that both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft were requested more 
than 30% of the time.  Combined with the results of the previous significance tests, it 
appears the respondents requested both types of aircraft on at least 20% of the missions 
but less than 30%.  Using the Microsoft Excel Solver program, the results showed that 
the maximum percentage that is significant is 23.58%; this indicates that the respondents 
requested both aircraft 23.58% of the time.   
Since statistical evidence confirmed the need for both rotary-wing and fixed-wing 
aircraft, it became necessary to find a ratio of rotary-wing to fixed-wing aircraft that 
would inform the aircraft consistency of a Special Operations Air Task Group.  The data 
from Table 11 was applied to the following probability of intersection equation,  
 
where RW is rotary-wing aircraft and FW is fixed-wing aircraft.  The intersection graphic 
containing data from Table 11 is shown in Figure 20, 
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Figure 20.   Ratio of Rotary-Wing to Fixed-Wing. 
Figure 20 indicates respondents chose only rotary-wing thirty six times, only fixed-wing 
three times, and both rotary and fixed-wing nineteen times; these responses are combined 
to reveal fifty five total responses (71.4%) that contained rotary-wing and twenty two 
total responses (28.6%) that contained fixed-wing.  Seventy-one point four percent 
(71.4%) to 28.6% is significant, as it defines the ratio of aviation platforms in each 
Special Operations Air Task Group. 
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